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This dissertation is comprised of two essays, examining trends in wages, education,
and labor supply of married women in India. The first chapter examines the key ques-
tion—why Indian married women’s labor force participation(LFP) declined from 35% in
1983 to 24% in 2011, during a period accompanied by high economic growth (between 6%
and 7% per year), increasing educational attainment, and falling fertility. Importantly, real
wages of both men and women grew over the same period, which economic theory suggests
should have opposite effects on the incentive of married women to participate in market
work. As straightforward as this proposition may appear, direct evidence is surprisingly
scarce. Using data from India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization’s Employment
and Unemployment surveys, I construct a unique sample of 681,204 matched husband-wife
pairs. I employ a household model of labor supply and examine whether, with rising wages,
income effects depressed female LFP, and to what extent did an own-wage positive sub-
stitution effect offset this decline. As a simpler explanation and to showcase my data, I
conduct a shift-share dual-decomposition of trends in wives’ LFP with respect to the trends
in education of husbands and wives. I find that changes in the educational composition of
neither husbands nor wives explain the observed decline in wives LFP. Hence, an explana-
tion based on the evolution of wages and elasticities is more appropriate. Two-stage least
squares estimates of the model of household labor supply reveal positive wives’ own-wage
elasticities, rising from 0.25 in 1983 to 0.67 in 2011, and negative cross-wage elasticities,
“rising” from -0.54 in 1983 to -0.75 in 2011. Estimating the model for the period as a
whole, trends in wives’ wages imply an increase in women’s LFP of 8.6 percentage points,
ii
and trends in husbands’ wages imply a decrease of 20.8 percentage points, for an overall
decline of 12.2 percentage points. In other words, though wives’ rising own-wage elasticities
and wages should have implied an increase in their LFP, but the wives’ rising cross-wage
elasticities coupled with their husbands’ rising wages account for the same magnitude as
the decline in the wives’ LFP.
The second essay within this dissertation examines how the change in observed
wages and gender wage gap reflects the changing composition of the female workforce in
India. Between 1983 and 2011, the average real wage increased by 149% and 55% for In-
dian married women and men, respectively. At the same time, there was rapid economic
growth (between 6% and 7% per year) as well as rising educational attainment in India.
I use my unique sample of matched husband-wife pairs to study the change in standard-
ized selection bias, which, by definition changes, because wives’ behavior has changed in
terms of the relationship between standardized wages and employment status. I employ the
Gronou-Heckman-Roy model to show how growing inequality within gender can increase
measured wages via a changing selection bias—even if the aggregate female employment rate
is held constant—by changing the relative importance of market and nonmarket factors for
explaining which women are employed. The empirical analysis shows how the Heckman
two-step estimator, when applied to Indian data, suggests that selection into the wives’
wage employment is consistently negative, however, is becoming less negative from -0.379
log points in 1983 to -0.181 log points in 2011. The selection bias being negative implies
that the less-skilled wives are a part of the wage-earning female workforce, and that the
average market wage of the wage-earning wife is less than the average (potential) market
wage of the non-employed wives. In addition, I find that the gender wage gap (using two-
step estimator) shows a moderate increase (in absolute value) from a -0.455 to a -0.503 log
wage point differential over the study period.
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Chapter 1
Why Did Indian Female Labor
Force Participation Decline?
Evidence from a Model of
Household Labor Supply
1.1 Introduction
Between 1983 and 2011, Indian married women’s labor force participation (LFP)
declined from 35% to 24%. This decline occurred even as India’s economy grew between
6% and 7% per year, educational attainment increased, and fertility declined during the
1990s and 2000s (Bosworth and Collins 2008).1 Importantly, real wages of both men and
women grew over the same period (Duraisamy 2002; Agrawal 2012; Mitra 2016; Jacoby
and Dasgupta 2018), which economic theory suggests should have opposite effects on the
1Total fertility declined from about 5.0 to 2.3 between 1975-80 and 2015-17 (United Nations, Department
of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division 2017), and female literacy rose from 29.7% in 1981 to
65.4% in 2011 (Office of Registrar General India, Census of India 2016). It is beyond the scope of this
paper to determine whether, and if so, why LFP among Indian women is “low” relative to other countries.
Appendix Figure A2 shows that for 2017, the female LFP in India of 27% is comparable to that of Bangladesh
(33%) and Pakistan (25%), although much lower than in Nepal (83%), China (61%) and the United States
(56%) (The World Bank 2017).
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incentive of married women to participate in market work.
As straightforward as this proposition may appear, direct evidence is surprisingly
scarce. I use a household model of labor supply and examine whether, with rising wages,
income effects depressed female LFP, and to what extent did an own-wage positive substitu-
tion effect offset this decline.2 I construct a unique sample of 681,204 matched husband-wife
pairs using data from India’s National Sample Survey (NSS) Organization’s Employment
and Unemployment surveys. These data allow me to estimate the sensitivity of women’s
LFP to their own and husbands’ wages, and evaluate the extent to which trends in wages
or elasticities account for the observed decline in LFP. Although this paper is not the first
to study Indian women’s declining LFP, it is the first, to my knowledge, to do so within a
structural household labor supply framework.
I also consider simpler explanations for the trends in married women’s LFP. In
particular, educational attainment rose among both men and women. Following Moffitt
(2012), I conduct a shift-share dual-decomposition of wives’ LFP and find that changes in
the educational composition of neither husbands nor wives explain the observed decline.
Hence, an explanation based on the evolution of wages and elasticities is more appropriate.
I estimate a static labor supply model, similar to Blau and Kahn (2007), in which wives’
LFP is specified to be a function of own and husbands’ wages. Like Moffitt (2012), I deal
with the problem of selection, imputing wages for non-wage workers and non-workers using
data solely on participants. To prevent endogeneity bias in the labor supply model, I follow
Blau and Kahn (2007) and use wives’ and husbands’ education as instruments for their
wages.
I find a positive and statistically significant own-wage substitution effect of wives’
LFP, increasing from 0.08 in 1983 to 0.15 in 2011. More strikingly, I find a steady and
dramatic 163% increase in wives’ own-wage elasticity, from 0.25 in 1983 to 0.67 in 2011.
In addition, I find a strong negative income effect of husbands’ wage, where a 10 log point
2Changes in labor supply behavior of married women have driven the changes in labor supply for women
overall, as married women make up 86% of the female working-age population (Office of Registrar General
India, Census of India 2011). The Section A.1 presents a comparison of LFP between single and married
women.
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increase in husband’s wage reduces the probability of wife’s LFP by between 1.6 and 1.9
percentage points over the study period. The estimated cross-wage elasticity to husbands’
wages became more negative, “rising” from -0.54 in 1983 to -0.75 in 2011. The relatively
dominant cross-wage elasticity of wives’ LFP provides support to the theory that, given
traditional gender roles, women are perceived as secondary earners within a family, and
their labor supply is likely to be more negatively affected by their spouse’s wages (Blau and
Kahn 2007; Goldin 2006). The results remain robust to additional imputation techniques
and alternative instruments used to estimate the labor supply model.
I also estimate models separately by wives’ education group and birth cohort. I
find lower own-wage and cross-wage elasticities at the extremes, and higher elasticities for
women with medium levels of education. Because LFP is highest among the least educated
wives, their estimated low elasticities are consistent with the so-called “dual-earner” models
of the household, where wives’ participation in the labor market is driven by the struggle
to subsist. The lower own-wage elasticity for better-educated wives is consistent with a
relatively higher taste for work, compared to wives with medium levels of education. I also
find that the estimated own-wage and cross-wage elasticities rise across the generations,
implying, among other things, that rising husbands’ wages have a more negative effect on
the LFP of wives of more recent birth cohorts.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of
the labor supply literature, focusing on India. Section 3 describes the data used and presents
a descriptive analysis of labor force and education for my sample of matched husband-wife
pairs, followed by a dual decomposition exercise of LFP by wives’ and husbands’ educational
groups. Section 4 outlines the empirical specification used, followed by the estimation results
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
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1.2 Recent Research on Female Labor Supply
The decline in married women’s LFP in India could be consistent with the well-
documented cross-sectional, U-shaped relationship between women’s LFP and the stage
of economic development, known as the “Feminization-U” hypothesis (see, e.g., Boserup
1970; Goldin 1994; Mammen and Paxson 2000). Of course, it is one thing to find a U-
shaped relationship in an international cross-section, and quite another to observe such a
relationship in a single country over time as it develops. However, the hypothesis suggests
that with increases in education, men’s wages rise more quickly than those of women in
the early stages of economic development, giving rise to a relatively stronger and negative
income effect against women’s work. The reverse is true in the later stages, giving rise to a
relatively strong substitution effect in favor of women’s work.
In her study of historical trends in women’s LFP in the U.S., Goldin (2006) expands
upon this hypothesis with the addition of changing wage and income elasticities. Her
findings suggest that the own-wage elasticity of labor supply was relatively low in the
1920s, with aggregate female labor supply concentrated among lower-income, less-educated
households. At the same time, a lack of “respectable” jobs and substantial social stigma
regarding the work of women caused the income elasticity of women’s labor supply to be
relatively large.3 As the U.S. economy grew, women’s own-wage substitution elasticity
increased and their income elasticity decreased. The growth in the U.S. economy coupled
with an increased demand for clerical workers, an increased supply of high school graduates,
and the rise of part-time work allowed for these changes in women’s labor supply elasticities.4
Blau and Kahn (2007) extended the literature by investigating married women’s
3Goldin (1990) collected and tabulated a number of estimates of labor supply elasticities over the twentieth
century. She concluded that American women’s income elasticity decreased (in absolute value), while their
own-wage elasticity first rose and then fell. In 1900, income elasticity was -1.32 and own-wage substitution
elasticity was 0.26 (Fraundorf 1979). During the period 1950-1980, income elasticity reduced to -0.52 and
the own-wage substitution elasticity increased to 1.13 (Smith and Ward 1984).
4Along with the creation of part-time jobs that increased elasticity of the women’s labor supply function,
Goldin (2006) and Greenwood et al. (2005) note the role of reinforcing factors such as the widespread
availability of basic facilities of electricity, running water, and the flush toilet, along with the diffusion of
modern, electric household technologies. Though it is worth noting that the Indian and U.S. economy had
different nature of growth and the strength of these reinforcing factors, it is beyond the scope of this paper
to delve into these in detail.
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labor supply and their elasticities from 1980 to 2000 in the United States. They find that
increases in real wages of women in the 1980s and 1990s caused a rise in women’s labor
supply during both decades. However, the increase in married men’s real wages contributed
to an income effect in the 1990s and thus slowed the growth of women’s labor supply.
They find a steady reduction of women’s own-wage and cross-wage labor supply elasticities
between 1980 and 2000—married women’s own-wage elasticity was reduced by an estimated
50% to 56%, while their cross-wage elasticity fell by an estimated 38% to 47% in absolute
value.5 These declining labor supply elasticities are consistent with the pattern expected by
Goldin (1990), where married women’s rise in education changes their view of employment
from “jobs” to “careers.” Following Blau and Kahn (2007), I examine the LFP of married
Indian women and investigate the strength of their participation elasticities over time.
Although several studies discuss female labor supply in India, they do not address
the role of substitution and income effects to understand a woman’s labor supply function.
A study by Klasen and Pieters (2015) establishes a U-shaped relationship between female
LFP and their education and estimates a reduced form labor supply model to study the
stagnation of urban women’s LFP for the years 1987-2011. The study finds a decline in
the positive participation effect from women’s education and a strong, negative income
effect—proxied by total wages of household members minus the women’s wages, education
of household head, and presence of a salaried household member—while controlling for
demographic and local demand-supply variables.6
Afridi et al. (2016) estimate a reduced form LFP model for rural married women for
the years 1987, 1999, and 2009. They decompose women’s LFP as a function of individual
variables, including women’s age and education, and household variables.7 The results show
5Heim (2007) studied married women’s labor supply in the U.S. from 1979 to 2003 and observed a decline
in both wage and income elasticities. He found more than a 60% decrease in hours wage elasticity, more
than a 70% decrease in the absolute value of the hours’ income elasticity, a 95% decrease in the participation
wage elasticity, and more than a 60% decrease in the participation income elasticity.
6Local demand-supply variables include the share of male workers by their industry and the share of
college-educated individuals in the working age population.
7The household variables include the amount of land owned by a household, monthly consumption ex-
penditure, education of household male members, household size, the presence of children, religion, and
caste.
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that women’s rising education explains 22% of the decline in LFP between 1987 and 1999
and 11% of the decline between 1999 and 2009; while men’s rising education explains 54%
of the decline between 1987 and 1999 and 14% of the decline between 1999 and 2009. This
study provides suggestive evidence of women’s rising returns to home production, from an
increase in their educational attainment, as a possible mechanism to explain the declining
female LFP.
Recent work by Neff et al. (2012) provides descriptive evidence on the LFP of women
from rural India for the years 2004 and 2009. To explain the decline in female LFP, they
consider an education effect resulting from more women pursuing higher education, an in-
come effect measured by mean male household wages, lack of employment opportunities for
women, and the influence of socio-cultural norms. They establish a U-shaped relationship
between women’s LFP and education, and they find an education effect from an increased
enrollment by women aged 15-24.8 The results show a negative impact of household’s mean
male wages on women’s LFP as well as a U-shaped relationship between women’s LFP and
the household’s monthly per-capita consumption expenditure.
My paper builds on the largely descriptive and reduced-form analysis of prior litera-
ture to analyze Indian wives’ LFP within a structural household labor supply framework. I
construct a unique sample of matched husband-wife pairs, incorporating participation and
wage data from all reported activities over the years 1983 to 2011. This structural approach
of studying female labor supply allows me to obtain estimates which we can interpret within
the framework of economic theory. Further, these elasticity estimates provide insight for
understanding Indian married women’s labor supply, which we can compare with previously
documented estimates from other settings by Goldin (2006) and Blau and Kahn (2007).
8A few studies provide descriptive evidence for the impact of education enrollment on female LFP. Using
school attendance rates and differences in projected and actual workforce between the years 2004 and 2009,
Kannan and Raveendran (2012) find that additional enrollment in education may account for 27% of the
drop in overall female LFP. Abraham (2013) finds that the decline in LFP coincided with an increase in
educational attendance of women aged 16-25 for the years 1983-2009. In my analysis, I study married women
over the age of 20 to avoid a bias resulting from decisions of education.
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1.3 Data
The Employment and Unemployment Surveys of the National Sample Survey (NSS)
are the primary source of data for indicators of the Indian labor force.9 I use individual-
level data from seven cross sections of the NSS for the years 1983-84, 1987-88, 1993-94,
2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12.10 Each NSS survey covers around 500,000 persons
from 115,000 households.
A fundamental contribution of this paper is the construction of matched husband-
wife pairs using NSS data. Prior research on the LFP of Indian married women has con-
sidered only effects of average male earnings, rather than the earnings of husbands. In my
sample, I include pairs where both spouses live in the same household and are between the
ages of 20 and 59.11 Since NSS data do not provide spouse identification numbers, I use
information on each member’s relationship to the household’s head to match spouses.12 I
am able to uniquely identify and classify 92% of the married individuals from the master
NSS data.
Another contribution of this paper is incorporating participation and wage data
from all reported activities of an individual, unlike previous literature, which examines
LFP using only the first reported economic activity. The data show that an individual may
be involved in at most 5 activities, with first activity as a family helper, second activity
as a casual wage worker, and third activity as a non-participant. Thus, it is essential to
consider an individual’s different activities and their corresponding labor supply and wages
in the analysis.13
Table 1.1 presents summary statistics from the sample of matched husband-wife
pairs. All summary statistics are weighted by NSS sampling weights. The final sample
9The Census of India is another source of workforce data, but the information is quite limited (Kasturi
2015; Hirway 1999). Section A.1 provides a discussion on Census and NSS estimates.
10For purposes of exposition, I refer to their first year for the remainder of the paper.
11The age restrictions are imposed to reduce bias resulting from decisions of higher education and retire-
ment on LFP.
12Refer to the Section A.2 for an explanation on the construction of the sample of matched husband-wife
pairs.
13The Table A2 provides a comparison of mean wages from an individual’s first activity and mean wages
from all activities.
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consists of 681,204 matched husband-wife pairs, both aged between 20 and 59 years at the
time of the survey, from 1983 to 2011 covering all of India’s states and union territories.14
More than 70% of the couples reside in rural areas during all years of data. Scheduled
Caste-Scheduled Tribe households, which are lower-caste households, make up around 27%.
Eighty percent of the married couples follow Hinduism.15 The data show declining average
household size and declining average number of children, which indicate falling fertility. On
average, husbands are aged 38.1 in 1983 and 39.4 in 2011. The average age of wives is
relatively lower, ranging from 32.6 in 1983 to 34.8 in 2011. In the data, the proportion of
illiterate wives is 40% in 2011, which is relatively higher than illiterate husbands (23.1%).
The proportion of husbands who are illiterate, literate below primary, and primary declined
over the study period by 21.6 percentage points, 3 percentage points, and 2 percentage
points, respectively. At the same time, the proportion of husbands with middle, secondary
and a college degree grew by 6.3 percentage points, 11.8 percentage points, and 8.4 per-
centage points, respectively. Wives became more educated over the study period, with the
highest growth in the secondary level category—an increase of 12.4 percentage points.
In this paper, LFP is calculated using the individual’s usual principal and subsidiary
status (UPSS), collected by the NSS, which captures the activity status of the person during
the year prior to the date of survey.16 Following the activity status information provided
by NSS, I define individuals to be in the labor force if they respond as a self-employed
(own-account worker or employer), an unpaid family helper in a household enterprise, a
regular salaried worker, a casual wage worker, or unemployed.17
Table 1.2 presents trends in activity and LFP of the wives and their husbands for
the period 1983-2011. LFP of wives declined from 35% in 1983 to 24% in 2011. Most non-
14Union territories are a type of administrative division in the Republic of India, ruled directly under by
the central government.
15I include region, caste and religion variables as demographic explanatory variables to capture impacts of
culturally or religiously imposed restrictions on women (see, e.g., Olsen and Mehta 2006; Kapsos et al. 2014;
Klasen and Pieters 2015; Afridi et al. 2016)
16NSS also classifies activities for the reference period of one week (called current weekly status) and each
day of the reference week (called current daily status). Compared to these, UPSS defined activities are more
stable, long-term, and thus more suitable for studying employment patterns.
17This definition is consistent with the description used by the NSS as well as previous literature on Indian
female LFP.
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participating wives are homemakers and engaged in household work.18 For participating
wives, the proportion of regular salaried workers increased by 1.2 percentage points over the
study period. The LFP of husbands remained high and stable at around 98%. In 2011, the
majority of the husbands worked as self-employed (39%), followed by casual wage workers
(33%) and regular salaried workers (19%).
Figure 1.1 shows wives’ LFP, from 1983 to 2011, categorized by wives’ educational
level. Consistent with previous literature, the relationship between Indian wives’ LFP and
their education level is U-shaped.19 The figure shows that the participation rate is highest
for the least educated and the most educated women. In comparison, women lying in
between these ends of the education distribution have lower levels of participation. Although
the participation rate is the highest for the least educated wives, the proportion of illiterate
wives participating declines over time. The overall decline of wives’ LFP is a result of a
decline in LFP of least educated women, combined with a moderate increase in LFP of
highly educated women.20
Figure 1.2 shows wives’ LFP by husbands’ education level. The data show a clear
negative relationship between wives’ LFP and their husbands’ education, suggesting a strong
negative income effect. LFP of wives of illiterate men is the highest throughout the years,
ranging from 46% in 1983 to 32.1% in 2011. The graph also shows that wives of highly
educated men are less likely to participate in the labor force, with the LFP of women
married to men with secondary education and men with a college degree are the lowest,
both around 18% in 2011.
1.3.1 Decomposition of Change in LFP by Change in Education
The educational attainment of both Indian men and women rose over the last two
decades. The data show a U-shaped relationship between wives’ LFP and their level of
18According to the NSS, homemakers are classified as individuals involved in “domestic duties” and “do-
mestic and allied activities.”
19Klasen and Pieters (2015), Chaudhary, Verick, et al. (2014), and Andres et al. (2017) also discuss the
U-shaped relationship between LFP of Indian married women and their level of education.
20The unusually high labor force participation rate for the year 2004 is pointed out in previous literature as
well, citing reasons of changes in survey agency and misrecording of certain information (Kapsos et al. 2014).
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education. Further, there is a clear negative relationship between wives’ LFP and their
husbands’ level of education. Before undertaking a more formal econometric approach, it
is worth examining whether changes in the education levels of husbands and wives may
explain the trends in Indian wives’ LFP.
Following Moffitt (2012), I carry out a shift-share dual-decomposition of the LFP
changes over time as a function of the composition of wives’ and husbands’ education levels.





h)× (LFPwt |Eh). (1.1)




the fraction of wives married to husbands with education level Eh, and (LFPwt |Eh) is the
labor force participation rate of wives married to husbands with education level Eh. The








The first term on the right-hand-side is “explained” by changes in the composition of hus-
bands’ education levels, and the second term is the “unexplained” component—the change
in wives’ labor force participation rates within husbands’ education levels. The results in
Table 1.3 indicate that changes in husbands’ education explain virtually none of the changes
over the 1983-1993 and 2004-2011 periods, and only 1.2% of the change for 1993-2004.2122
Table 1.3 also shows the effects of changes in the education composition of wives









21The total time period has been divided into three roughly equal smaller time periods.
22Between 1993 and 2004, the total increase in wives’ LFP is 0.371. Of the total change, 0.005 is explained,
corresponding to 1.2% of 0.371.
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The first term on the right-hand side is the “explained” change, defined as the change
in population share of wives from different levels of education married to husbands of a
given education, weighted by their base year participation rate. The second term is the
“unexplained” change, defined as the change in the participation rate of wives from different
levels of education married to husbands of a given education level, weighted by the base
year population share.23
Compared to the aggregate results, the decomposition results for husbands’ dif-
ferent levels of education show that demographic factors explain a greater fraction of the
decline in wives’ LFP. For the period 1983-93, demographic changes explain 28.9% (that
is, 0.009 of 0.032, the total change) of the 3.2% decline in LFP of wives married to illit-
erate husbands and 66% of the 2.1% decline in LFP of wives married to college-educated
husbands. However, demographic factors explain relatively less of the total change for the
middle (7.7%) and secondary educated (9.5%) husbands. For 1993-2004, demographic fac-
tors explain 23.4% of the total change in LFP for primary educated husbands and 20% of
the total change for middle level educated husbands. Demographic factors explain 13% of
the total change in LFP for illiterate, 16% for primary educated, and 15.3% for husbands
with a college degree for the period 2004 to 2011.
Table 1.4 presents the decomposition for wives by their education level, Ew.24
Changes in wives’ education composition do not adequately explain changes in wives’ LFP,
especially for the latter two periods. For the period 1983-1993, the aggregate change in
overall wives’ education groups was -0.007, of which changes in wives’ education explain
26%. The aggregate change was 0.34 during 1993-2004, of which changes in wives’ educa-
tion contribute nothing to explain the decline in their LFP. For 2004-2011, the aggregate
change was -0.54, of which the changes in wives’ education explain 0.03%.
The table also shows the decomposition results for different levels of wives’ educa-
23For example, between 1983 and 1993, for illiterate husbands, the explained change is the change in the
fraction of wives from each education level married to illiterate husbands weighted by their population share
summed over all level of wives’ education.
24The extension of equations (1.1) and (1.2) to condition on wives’ education (instead of Eh) is suppressed
to reduce clutter.
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tion.25 For the years 1983-1993, demographic factors explain 61% of the total change of
LFP for wives belonging to the illiterate group, 66% for wives belonging to literate below
primary education group, 38% for middle educated wives, and 85% for wives with a college
degree. Demographic factors explain some of the change in LFP for wives in all education
groups except for illiterate wives for 1993-2004. The explained proportion is low around
20% for both literate below primary and primary wives, 30% for middle educated, 41% for
secondary educated, and 70% for college-educated wives. For the last period, 2004-2011,
demographic factors explain 31% of the total change in LFP for illiterate wives but nothing
for the other groups.
In addition, the results presented in Appendix B show that the educational com-
position of husbands or wives does not adequately explain the decline in wives’ LFP, even
after considering the difference in their region of residence. The insufficiency of husbands’
and wives’ education to explain the decline in wives’ LFP supports an explanation based
on the evolution of wives’ LFP elasticities.
1.3.2 Rising Wages of Husbands and Wives
Finally, it is worth noting the growth of wages in India during the last two decades.
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show that between 1983-2011, both husbands and wives experienced
growth in mean log real daily wages.26 Between the years 1983 and 2011, wives’ mean log
real daily wages increased from 3.67 to 4.63, whereas husbands’ mean log real daily wages
increased from 4.58 to 5.16. Separating wages by wives’ education group, Figure 1.3 shows
rising wages for wives in all education levels, except the secondary level.
The growth in real wages, most pronounced in the two ends of the wives’ educational
distribution, was expected to increase wives’ LFP through a positive own-wage substitution
25Equation (1.3) can be modified to calculate decomposition results for wives’ different levels of education:
Conditioning on wives’ education, the “explained” change is thus the change in share of wives from a given
education married to husbands from different levels of education weighted by their participation rate in the
base year.
26These are real log daily wages, summed over all reported activities, earned by wage employees (regular
salaried and casual wage workers). The daily wages have been deflated using the World Bank’s Consumer
Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution are trimmed to avoid
outliers.
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effect. However, as is shown in Figure 1.1, wives in the lower levels of education experienced
a decline in LFP along with only a moderate increase in LFP of highly educated women.
In comparison to wives’ wages, Figure 1.4 shows that husbands earn relatively higher real
daily wages across all education groups and their overall mean log real daily wages rose from
4.58 in 1983 to 5.16 in 2011. As additional evidence of an income effect, Figure 1.5 shows a
negative relationship between wives’ LFP and wage quintiles of their husbands. The data
show that wives of men from the top wage quintile have lower participation rates than wives
of husbands from the lowest wage quintile. In addition, over the study period, participation
rates of wives married to low earning men declined as opposed to rising participation rates of
wives married to high earning men. The rising wages of both husbands and wives, coupled
with wives’ falling LFP make it necessary for us to consider changes in wives’ responsiveness




I adopt a simple unitary family labor supply framework, as discussed in Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999). The household consists of two working-age individuals, the husband
and the wife. Households are assumed to maximize joint utility over consumption, Ct, and
the leisure of each household member, Lht and L
w
t . For each household, utility may be
expressed as




t , Xt), (1.4)
where Xt is a vector of household attributes.
27 The budget constraint equates full con-













t T = Mt. (1.5)
27Household attributes may include the number of children or any other dependents in the household.
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The consumption good is taken as the numeraire, W ht is husband’s wage, W
w
t is wife’s wage,
Yt is non-labor income, Mt denotes “full income”, and T is total time available. Assuming
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t . (1.7)
The above conditions equate the marginal utility of consumption to λt, the marginal utility
of income, and the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility cost of leisure. Assuming

















t ,Mt, Xt). (1.10)
In the demand function given by (1.10), Ri ≡ T − Li, is the labor supply of the husband
or wife and dRi = −dLi. Note that leisure, Li refers to an individual’s non market time,
referring to true leisure or time spent in household production.
Mincer (1962a) pointed out that tastes, biological or cultural factors, and relative
prices from different marginal productivity in the market and alternative pursuits determine
the distribution of leisure, market work, and home production by each family member.
Therefore, as shown in equation (1.10), an increase in either spouse’s wage affects their labor
supply depending on the relative strength of their substitution and income effects. However,
an increase in the husband’s wage also affects the wife’s labor supply through a combination
of income and cross-substitution effects. For an income effect, an increase in husband’s
wage increases wife’s consumption of leisure (assuming it is a normal good), leading to
14
a substitution of her market time with non-market time. For a cross-substitution effect,
the wife compensates for husband’s reduced non-market time with increased household
production (Gronau 1977). In the Indian context, the effect of the husband’s wage on wife’s
labor supply mostly captures an income effect since the cross-substitution effect is likely to
be minimal.28
1.4.2 Empirical Specification
I adapt Blau and Kahn (2007)’s static labor supply model and estimate




t + βXXt + κSTATE + ε
w
t (1.11)
to obtain wives’ LFP elasticities.29 In (1.11), LFPwt is wives’ labor force participation, W
w
t
is wife’s wage, W ht is husband’s wage, Xt is a vector of control variables, STATE is a vector
of state controls, and εwt is the error term, all at time t.
30 As is common in models of wives’
labor supply, wages are not observed for non-participants, which account for between 65%
and 76% over the study period. Therefore, I impute wages for non-participants following the
approach of Moffitt (2012), where wages for nonworkers are estimated through an auxiliary
wage equation using data solely on participants. Wages are imputed using the equation






t ×AGEst ) + νst , (1.12)
estimated separately for spouse s in year t. In (1.12), W st is the daily wage rate, EDUC
s
t
is a vector of educational categories, AGEst is a vector of age categories, and ν
s
t is the
error term. The resulting estimates are used to impute wages for nonworkers, those self-
28Many studies suggest that most household domestic activities are primarily carried out by women (World
Economic Forum 2014; Choudhary et al. 2009). I am unable to confirm this within my data as NSS does
not provide information on time allocation by household members.
29Equation (1.11) is not identical to that of Blau and Kahn (2007), omitting a measure of household
assets, which are not available in the NSS data. Their model allows for the possibility that household
decisions deviate from the unitary model, by specifying distinct effects of husbands’ wage and household
assets, suggesting the effects of “other income” depend on the source of that income.
30Control variables used are dummies for wives’ age groups, husbands’ age groups, caste, religion, and
region.
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employed, and those with invalid wage observations (below the first and above the ninety-
ninth percentiles).31
I follow the established approach from the labor supply literature and estimate (1.11)
using two-stage least squares (2SLS), which is consistent even when wages are correlated
with the error term in the labor supply equation. Similar to Blau and Kahn (2007), I use
husbands’ and wives’ education as instruments for their wages in my main specification
and check the robustness of my results by using three alternative sets of instruments.32
In addition, as discussed in Section 1.3.1, educational composition of husbands or wives
does not drive the trends in wives’ LFP, providing evidence in favor of the exogeneity of
education.33 I first obtain fitted values of imputed wages separately for each spouse and
survey year using
















t + κSTATE + ξ
w
t . (1.14)
In the equations above, lnW ht and lnW
w
t are the imputed log real daily wages for husbands
and wives at time t, estimated from (1.12). Next, stage two estimates (1.11) with lnŴwt
and lnŴ ht , the fitted value of the regressors on the right hand side. I bootstrap the entire
procedure to correct the bias in standard errors arising from the multistage nature of the
estimation.34
31Moffitt (2012) and Blau and Kahn (2007) use an imputation method similar to the one used by Juhn
(1992) and Juhn et al. (1991). In particular, they assign workers with missing wage information the mean
wage rate of marginal participants, defined as those who worked 13 weeks or fewer. I am unable to impute
wages based on weeks worked, which are not available in NSS, but as a robustness check, follow the spirit
of their approach by assigning mean wages of workers who report only a single market work activity.
32Juhn (1992), Heim (2007), Bradbury and Katz (2008), and Macunovich (2010) have used education as
an instrument for wages. I use additional instruments including (i) husband-wife education bins, (ii) each
spouse’s corresponding wage decile and education, and (iii) each spouse’s corresponding mean state wage
and education.
33Under the argument that education may have a direct impact on participation aside from its indirect
effect through wages (education may be correlated with tastes such that a college graduate may be more
likely to be a participant than a high school dropout), this estimation provides an upper bound estimate of
the effect of wages on wives’ LFP.
34Two hundred bootstrap replications are carried out.
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The parameters of interest are βw, representing the uncompensated Marshallian
substitution effect of the change in wife’s wage, and βh, representing the uncompensated
Marshallian income effect of a change in husband’s wage. We would expect to see a positive
own-wage substitution effect for an upward sloping labor supply curve. In addition, we
expect to find a negative βh providing evidence for an income effect, meaning that ceteris
paribus, with an increase in husband’s wage (considered as the wife’s non-labor income),
wife’s consumption of leisure increases and the probability of her participation in the labor
force falls.
1.5 Estimation Results
1.5.1 Labor Supply Estimates Using Ordinary Least Squares
Table 1.5 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for (1.11). Each column
represents a separate year-wise bootstrapped estimation of wives’ LFP using wives’ imputed
wages, husbands’ imputed wages, control variables, and state fixed effects. The results show
an own-wage positive substitution effect on the wives’ LFP ranging from 0.07 in 1983 to
0.08 in 2011. Wives’ estimated own-wage elasticities (at mean LFP) are positive, significant,
and increase from 0.23 in 1983 to 0.38 in 2011.
OLS estimates provide clear evidence of a strong income effect, with a negative and
statistically significant coefficient on husbands’ wages. The effect of husbands’ wages on
wives’ LFP decreased in magnitude from -0.14 in 1983 to -0.09 in 2011. The estimated
cross-wage elasticities of wives’ LFP are negative and statistically significant for all the
survey years. However, the OLS estimates show that the wives’ degree of responsiveness to
their husbands’ wages ranges from -0.45 in 1983 to -0.40 in 2011.
These estimates of wives’ LFP establish positive and statistically significant own-
wage effects as well as negative and statistically significant cross-wage effects for the years
1983 to 2011. However, the important caveat is the endogeneity of wages, arising from
unobservable characteristics (such as ability or motivation) or measurement error. I address
17
this by employing a 2SLS estimation of (1.11), the results of which are discussed in the next
section.
1.5.2 Labor Supply Estimates Using Two-stage Least Squares
Table 1.6 presents 2SLS estimates for wives’ LFP from (1.11), where the dependent





a set of controls. Each column represents a year-wise bootstrapped estimation of the wives’
LFP, after employing wives’ and husbands’ education as instruments. The table indicates
that the own-wage substitution effect of the wives is positive, statistically significant, and
steadily increasing over the years 1983 to 2011. In 1983, a 100 percentage point increase
in a wife’s wage increased the probability of her participation by 7.88 percentage points
as opposed to 15.3 percentage points in 2011. Another striking result is the increase in
wives’ own-wage elasticity (evaluated at the mean LFP), from 0.25 in 1983 to 0.67 in 2011.
Compared to the OLS results in Table 1.5, 2SLS estimates show greater increases in both
wives’ own-wage substitution effect and own-wage substitution elasticity over the study
period.
The second set of results for wives’ LFP, shown in Table 1.6, quantifies the impact
of husbands’ wages. I find significant, negative effects of husbands’ wages on wives’ labor
supply in each year. Compared to the OLS results, I find higher negative income effects,
which vary between -0.17 in 1983 and 2011 but reach a peak of -0.198 in 2007. Wives’
LFP elasticity (at the mean) to husbands’ wages increased in absolute value from -0.54
in 1983 to -0.75 in 2011, implying an increase in responsiveness. The wives’ cross-wage
elasticity is dominant compared to their own-wage elasticity for all years, consistent with
the existence of traditional gender roles. This is the case when wives are more likely to be
secondary earners in a household, and their LFP is likely to be more negatively affected by
their spouse’s wages.35 Estimating the model for the period as a whole, shown in the last
35Table B7 in the appendix presents estimation results of wives’ labor force participation using maximum
likelihood. The results are qualitatively similar to 2SLS results of Table 1.6, showing an increase in wives’
own-wage elasticity from 0.42 in 1983 to 0.89 in 2011 and a consistently dominant, negative cross-wage
elasticity, increasing from -0.8 in 1983 to -0.96 in 2011.
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column of Table 1.6, I find a significant positive own-wage elasticity of 0.4 and a significant,
relatively dominant, negative cross-wage elasticity of -0.66. Given these elasticity estimates
and increase in wives’ and husbands’ wages over 1983-2011, trends in wives’ wages imply an
increase in women’s LFP of 8.6 percentage points, and trends in husbands’ wages imply a
decrease of 20.8 percentage points, for an overall decline of 12.2 percentage points in wives’
LFP.
Following the reasoning in Blau and Kahn (2007), I also estimate (1.11) controlling
for the presence of children in the household. As the authors discuss, it may be that
fertility decisions are governed primarily by preferences, and women who prefer smaller
families might invest more in human capital leading to greater participation in the labor
market. In such a scenario, not controlling for the number of children might overstate the
positive relationship between wages and labor supply. On the other hand, the decision to
have children may be the result of an overall set of time allocation decisions (Angrist and
Evans 1996; Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980). Under this reasoning, controlling for the number
of children might understate the relationship between wages and labor supply, especially
if a higher wage leads to higher participation and fewer children. Table B6 shows that
the results are qualitatively similar to the basic labor supply model (Table 1.6), even after
controlling for the number of children in different age groups.
1.5.3 Robustness
The pattern of the coefficients on wives’ own and their husbands’ wages, which
yield these striking results for rising wives’ own and husbands’ wage elasticities hold un-
der different imputation techniques and alternative instruments. As a robustness check, I
implement wage imputations similar to Juhn et al. (1991) and Juhn (1992), and estimate
wages for non-participants through a wage equation using data on marginal participants.
Since the NSS data do not report a worker’s number of weeks worked, I identify marginal
participants as workers involved in only one work activity.36 In addition, I control for the
36Non-workers can be argued to be more similar to marginal participants than others, regarding their
characteristics including earning power.
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occupation reported by the marginal participants. Wives’ LFP elasticity estimates using
these imputations, presented in Table B8, are consistent with the main specification (Table
1.6).
For additional robustness checks, I employ three alternative sets of instruments to
account for the endogeneity of wages in the labor supply equation.37 The 2SLS elasticity
estimates using the alternative instruments of husband-wife education groups, each spouse’s
wage decile and education, and each spouse’s mean state wage and education, presented in
Tables B10, B11, and B12, respectively, are qualitatively similar to the main specification.
1.5.4 Discussion: Why Might Elasticities Change Over Time?
Indian wives’ LFP elasticity estimates show a significant and positive own-wage
substitution effect as well as a significant and negative income effect. There is clear evidence
of rising responsiveness of Indian wives to changes in their wages as well as their husbands’
wages over the study period. Also, we observe a dominant, negative cross-wage elasticity
compared to the wives’ positive own-wage elasticity across all the years.
The elasticity estimates obtained for Indian wives support the pattern discussed
in Goldin (2006). In her study of historical trends in women’s LFP in the U.S., Goldin
(2006) discusses the evolution of married women’s labor supply elasticities. During the
early twentieth century in the U.S., the own-wage elasticity for married women was relatively
low, with aggregate female labor supply concentrated among lower-income, less-educated
households. At the same time, strong social stigma (due in large measure to the nature of
work) against wives’ paid employment caused the income elasticity to be large and greatly
exceed the positive substitution effect from wives’ wages.
However, over the twentieth century in the U.S., Goldin argues that economic
37An alternative approach to IV analyses to correct omitted variable bias is to use grouped data (Angrist
1991). Within each group, as group size increases, observations with high values of tastes for work and
unmeasured productivity will tend to cancel out with observations with low values for these unmeasured
factors. Using group averages, therefore, makes it more likely that observed correlations between wage and
LFP represent the true economic effects. To allow the use of group averages, I create wives’ age-husbands’
age-wives’ education-husbands’ education cells. Wives’ LFP estimation results using these grouped averages
on pooled data, presented in Table B15, show a positive, significant own-wage effect as well as a relatively
dominant, negative, and significant cross-wage effect.
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growth, changing mix of jobs in the economy, declining institutional barriers to married
women’s employment, and women’s rising educational attainment contributed to an in-
crease in the wives’ own-wage effect and a decline in their husbands’ cross-wage effect.38
Therefore, estimates of wives’ rising own-wage elasticity for India over 1983-2011 may be un-
derstood as a result of changes in the economy stemming from rising educational attainment
of wives and growth of white-collar jobs.
To further probe changing elasticities over time in the Indian context, I investigate
the degree to which the levels or time trends in participation responsiveness to husbands
(and own) wages differ among subgroups of married women. If levels of responsiveness
vary among women in different education levels and the mix of education groups shifts
over time, these shifts could help to explain changes in the (overall) elasticities of wives’
LFP, as discussed in Section 1.5.5. Further in Section 1.5.6, I examine elasticities by wives’
birth cohorts to investigate the generational differences resulting from economic growth and
changing norms.
1.5.5 Labor Supply Estimates By Wives’ Education Groups
To consider shifts in relative size of education groups while measuring compensation
more accurately within a group, I estimate wives’ LFP elasticity by educational attainment.
Table 1.7 presents wives’ LFP elasticity results by wives’ education groups on pooled data.39
Consistent with the trend in wives’ LFP, shown in Figure 1.1, the table displays an inverse
U-shaped relationship between wives’ education and their LFP elasticity estimates. That
is, the least educated and the most educated wives have lower own-wage and cross-wage
elasticities than the wives in the middle of the education distribution.
These findings are consistent with explanations put forward by Goldin (1990) and
Blau and Kahn (2007). Because wives’ LFP is highest among the least educated, the
38Other factors that led to the increase in American wives’ substitution effect was the rise of part-time
work coupled with reinforcing factors such as rising divorce rates, changing of women’s views on jobs and
careers along with the diffusion of household technologies (for example, the refrigerator and the washing
machine) and basic facilities of running water and electricity (Greenwood et al. 2005; Goldin 2006).
39Table B13 presents additional elasticity estimates of wives’ LFP, by wives’ education groups across time.
The inverse-U relationship between wives’ elasticity and education groups holds true.
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low estimated own-wage elasticity is consistent with so-called “dual-earner” models of the
household, where wives’ participation in the labor market is driven by the struggle to subsist.
Further, the high cross-wage elasticity of the least educated wives reflects the prevalence
of traditional gender roles and the role of wives as secondary earners in the household.
As wives’ become more educated, they place greater importance on their labor market
status and become more elastic to their wages. However, medium-educated wives also
face social barriers to out-of-home employment, since their work sends a negative signal
value regarding the husband’s adequacy as the family’s provider.40 As opposed to the
medium-educated wives, college-educated wives have lower own-wage elasticity, reflecting
their relatively higher tastes for work, as they view it not as “jobs” but as a “career.”
Further, college-educated wives are relatively less elastic to their husbands’ wages, as their
employment is argued to reflect the high value of their market time rather than a low value
of their husbands’ income.
1.5.6 Labor Supply Estimates by Wives’ Birth Cohorts
I construct five-year birth cohorts of wives to study the degree to which the levels or
time trends in participation responsiveness to husband (and own) wages differ among women
over time.41 Table 1.8 presents weighted summary statistics of wives’ LFP by their birth
cohort over the study period, where the data show that wives’ LFP falls within their birth
cohorts over time. Further, in any given year, LFP is U-shaped across cohorts. For instance,
in 2007, LFP for the birth cohort 1949-1953 is 28%, the participation rate increases for the
next few younger cohorts to 34% for women born between 1694-1968 and 1969-1973, and
then falls to 21.6% for the year’s youngest birth cohort, 1984-1988. LFP by wives’ cohorts
shows that LFP declines within a cohort as wives get older, and coupled with increasing
education, younger cohorts have lower LFP than relatively older cohorts.
Following the wage imputation technique outlined in (1.12) and using wives’ edu-
40Klasen and Pieters (2015) discuss the role of social stigma faced by Indian married women against work
outside the home, in regards to the U-shaped relationship between women’s LFP and education.
41Table B1 provides more information on the construction of wives’ birth cohorts.
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cation and husbands’ education as instruments, I estimate (1.11) for each birth cohort of
the wives.42 The results presented in Table 1.9 show a positive and significant own-wage
substitution effect on wives’ labor force participation, consistent across all cohorts. The
own-wage effect ranges from 0.08 for 1939-1943, an older cohort, to 0.15 for 1979-1983, a
younger cohort. I also find a negative and significant income effect of husbands’ wages for all
wives’ birth cohorts. Own-wage elasticity estimates imply higher responsiveness by wives
in younger cohorts than older cohorts. The estimated own-wage elasticity is 0.273 for wives
born in 1939-1943, as opposed to 0.55 for wives born in 1984-1988. I find that the wives
in the younger cohorts are also more responsive to their husbands’ wages, as the estimated
cross-wage elasticity is -0.861 for cohort 1984-1988 as opposed to -0.437 for cohort 1939-
1943. The elasticity estimates also show a consistently dominant cross-wage elasticity over
own-wage elasticity for all wives’ cohorts. Higher own-wage elasticity estimates by younger
cohorts reflect generational differences consistent with the explanation that younger cohorts
may be more able to circumvent norms that constrained the behavior of their elders.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper examines the key question—why Indian married women’s LFP declined
from 35% in 1983 to 24% in 2011, during a period accompanied by high economic growth,
increasing educational attainment, falling fertility, and, importantly, rising real wages among
both men and women. Using a household model of labor supply, I estimate the sensitivity
of women’s LFP to their own and husbands’ wages and evaluate the extent to which trends
in wages and elasticities explain this decline. Under a variety of imputation techniques and
instruments, the robust results reveal wives’ positive own-wage elasticities and negative
cross-wage elasticities to their husbands’ wages. Estimating the model for the period as a
42Table B14 presents wives’ LFP elasticity estimates for each cohort over time. The estimates show that
as wives get older, they become less elastic to their husbands’ wages but more elastic to their own wages.
Comparing across cohorts, the estimates show that the younger cohorts have relatively higher own-wage and
cross-wage LFP elasticities, consistent with results shown in Table 1.9. These findings are consistent with
the explanation that changes in wives’ LFP elasticities may not just reflect differences among generations
of women but also represent changes occurring in the Indian economy over time, regarding changing norms
and expectations of labor force commitment.
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whole, I find that trends in wages account for virtually all of the decline. In particular, the
rise in women’s real wages implies an increase in wives’ LFP of 8.6 percentage points, and
the rise in husbands’ wages, a decline of 20.8 percentage points, for a net decline of 12.2
percentage points.
The question arises whether these estimates are consistent with the U-shaped rela-
tionship between women’s LFP and the stage of economic development. As documented in
Boserup (1970), Goldin (1994), Mammen and Paxson (2000) and gaddis˙klasen, the early
stage of economic development coincides with a declining female LFP due to a relatively
strong, negative income effect against women’s work. A recent study of 162 countries finds
that the bottom of the U-shaped curve corresponds to a log GDP per capita of 8.31 (Lech-
man and Kaur 2015). India’s log GDP per capita was 5.74 in 1983, and 6.94 in 2011, which
falls on the downward-sloping portion of the U-shaped curve.43
Estimating the models separately by survey year, between 1983-2011, I find that
wives’ own-wage elasticity rose from 0.25 to 0.67 and that the cross-wage elasticity to their
husbands’ wages is relatively stronger, “increasing” from -0.54 to -0.75. These estimates
seem to be consistent with the evolution of elasticities observed for the U.S. by Goldin
(2006). Of course, caution is warranted when making comparisons between the early-
twentieth-century U.S. and contemporary India. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that in the
early twentieth century in the U.S., most female labor market participants were poorly
educated and lived in low-income households. In addition, the stigma associated with
women’s LFP may have contributed to a relatively strong and negative income effect against
women’s work in the better-educated, higher-income households.
However, over the twentieth century, economic growth in the U.S. increased the
demand for clerical labor, historically carried out by women, and may have contributed to
the dismantling of institutional and social barriers to married women’s employment. In
addition, women’s rising educational attainment led to higher wages, causing an increase in
their own-wage and a decline in their cross-wage elasticities. Similarly, estimates of Indian
43The numbers are natural logarithms of the national GDP per capita in constant 2005 U.S. dollars,
derived from World Development Indicators 2013.
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wives’ rising own-wage elasticity over 1983-2011 may be a result of changes in the Indian
economy stemming from economic growth, rising educational attainment of wives, and the
growth of white-collar jobs. The consistently dominant cross-wage elasticity estimates may
indicate the continuing prevalence of substantial social stigma against wives’ out-of-home
employment and the existence of traditional gender roles where wives are still perceived as
secondary earners in a household.
An alternative explanation for the strength of the cross-wage elasticity is that, as in-
comes rise above subsistence, families begin to favor child “quality” over “quantity” (Becker
and Lewis 1973). An important dimension of quality is time spent with the child, especially
by the mother. An extension of this paper could be to integrate decisions of fertility and
investment on children in a household model of labor supply for Indian women.
The effect of welfare policies on household labor supply decisions is of both scholarly
and policy importance. For example, the recently enacted “Modicare”, which builds upon
India’s National Health Insurance Program launched in 2008, aims to provide Indian families
with free hospital treatment costs of up to $7800 per year. The strong cross-wage elasticities
estimated in this paper suggest that the income effects on women’s labor supply of such a
policy could be substantial, especially for households of low and moderate levels of wealth.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Matched Husband-Wife Pairs
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Total
Rural 76.1 76.9 75.1 73.8 73.0 72.1 70.7 72.7
Caste: Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribe 26.6 27.0 27.6 28.1 28.5 28.8 27.6 28.1
Religion: Hindu 84.4 83.8 84.8 83.4 83.5 83.5 83.0 83.5
Mean Household Size 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.5
Mean Number of Children in the HH (aged 0-4) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
Mean Number of Children in the HH (aged 5-9) 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Mean Number of Children in the HH (aged 10-14) 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Husband Characteristics:
Mean Age 38.1 38.0 38.2 38.8 39.1 39.2 39.4 39.0
Education:
Illiterate 44.7 42.1 37.7 29.7 26.4 24.1 23.1 30.5
Literate Below Primary 14.2 14.7 14.4 12.1 10.8 10.4 11.2 12.1
Primary 15.3 15.4 13.6 14.5 15.5 14.7 13.3 14.5
Middle 11.8 11.6 13.5 16.9 18.4 18.1 18.1 16.2
Secondary 10.1 11.7 14.4 16.8 18.7 21.4 21.9 17.4
Graduate & Above 4.0 4.6 6.5 10.2 10.2 11.2 12.4 9.2
Wife Characteristics:
Mean Age 32.6 32.7 33.1 34.1 34.5 34.6 34.8 34.3
Education:
Illiterate 72.8 69.8 63.8 51.7 46.3 42.7 40.0 52.3
Literate Below Primary 7.2 8.2 9.0 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.4 9.4
Primary 9.2 9.5 9.6 11.6 13.2 13.1 12.4 11.6
Middle 5.6 5.8 8.0 11.9 13.4 13.3 13.7 11.0
Secondary 3.9 4.9 7.1 10.3 12.3 14.7 16.3 11.0
Graduate & Above 1.4 1.8 2.6 5.2 5.2 6.3 7.3 4.8
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995 681,204
Notes: Summary statistics using NSS data and NSS sampling weights. Matched husband-wife pairs are aged 20-59. SC-ST refers to scheduled
caste-scheduled tribe, the economically backward sections of the society. HH refers to household.
26
Table 1.2: Labor Force Participation of Wives and Husbands
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Change
Wives’ Activity:
Not in Labor Force 65.0 64.3 68.2 64.9 70.0 72.8 75.7 10.7
Labor force Participation Total 35.0 35.7 31.8 35.1 30.0 27.2 24.3 -10.7
Casual-wage Worker 18.8 14.5 16.2 14.9 13.8 12.5 10.1 -8.7
Helper in HH Enterprise 9.6 7.6 10.4 13.0 10.6 8.6 7.4 -2.2
Regular Salaried 2.2 2.6 2.2 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.4 1.2
Self Employed 4.1 10.0 2.7 3.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 -1.1
Unemployed 0.4 1.1 0.3 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.1
Husband’s Activity:
Not in Labor Force 2.0 1.8 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.7 1.9 -0.1
Labor force Participation Total 98.0 98.3 98.3 98.1 98.3 98.3 98.1 0.1
Self Employed 40.5 41.5 37.3 39.6 39.1 38.2 38.9 -1.6
Casual-wage Worker 32.6 32.9 35.1 32.5 33.9 35.4 33.3 0.7
Regular Salaried 19.1 19.3 18.4 17.5 18.0 17.7 19.3 0.2
Helper in HH Enterprise 5.1 3.5 6.8 7.8 7.0 6.8 6.3 1.2
Unemployed 0.7 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.4 -0.4
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: Weighted Summarized LFP trends presented for husband-wife pairs aged 20-59 constructed using NSS data. Column ‘Change’ refers to
change between 1983 to 2011.
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Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Total 0.029 -0.032 0.006 -0.009 0.023 0.019 0.021
Explained -0.005 -0.009 0.011 -0.024 0.002 0.002 0.014
1983-1993 Unexplained 0.034 -0.023 -0.005 0.016 0.022 0.017 0.007
Total 0.371 0.024 0.042 0.071 0.133 0.062 0.040
Explained 0.005 -0.006 -0.007 0.016 0.026 -0.020 -0.005
1993-2004 Unexplained 0.367 0.029 0.049 0.054 0.107 0.082 0.045
Total -0.424 -0.112 -0.044 -0.093 -0.081 -0.025 -0.069
Explained 0.000 -0.015 0.006 -0.015 0.013 0.021 -0.011
2004-2011 Unexplained -0.424 -0.098 -0.050 -0.078 -0.094 -0.046 -0.059
Notes: Decomposition is carried out on the sample of matched husband-wife pairs (both aged 20-59) using NSS sampling weights. I divide the
entire time period between 1983 and 2011 into roughly three equal periods, each spanning roughly 10 years.
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Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Total -0.007 -0.120 0.035 0.019 0.027 0.010 0.022
Explained -0.002 -0.074 0.023 -0.003 0.010 0.023 0.019
1983-1993 Unexplained -0.005 -0.046 0.012 0.022 0.016 -0.012 0.003
Total 0.340 0.052 0.058 0.072 0.083 0.032 0.044
Explained -0.018 -0.113 0.012 0.014 0.025 0.013 0.031
1993-2004 Unexplained 0.358 0.165 0.046 0.058 0.058 0.019 0.013
Total -0.542 -0.482 -0.029 -0.028 -0.022 0.020 -0.001
Explained -0.020 -0.150 0.027 0.013 0.014 0.050 0.024
2004-2011 Unexplained -0.522 -0.332 -0.056 -0.041 -0.036 -0.030 -0.025
Notes: Decomposition is carried out on the sample of matched husband-wife pairs (both aged 20-59) using NSS sampling weights. I divide the
entire time period between 1983 and 2011 into roughly three equal periods, each spanning roughly 10 years.
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Table 1.5: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using Ordinary Least Squares
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0709*** 0.0690*** 0.0716*** 0.0874*** 0.0939*** 0.0697*** 0.0859***
(0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0039)
Husband’s Wage -0.141*** -0.147*** -0.126*** -0.138*** -0.143*** -0.102*** -0.0932***
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.228*** 0.223*** 0.256*** 0.273*** 0.338*** 0.285*** 0.376***
(0.0143) (0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0173) (0.0167)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity
-0.453*** -0.476*** -0.451*** -0.430*** -0.516*** -0.418*** -0.408***
(0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0102) (0.0082) (0.0098) (0.0101) (0.0115)
Mean Values:
LFP of Wife 35.0 35.7 31.8 35.1 30.0 27.2 24.3
Wife’s Own Wage 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6
Husband’s Wage 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2
Observations 94594 104948 96675 108478 101313 87201 87995
Notes: Wages refer to log real daily imputed wages. Two hundred replications are carried out during the bootstrap. Bootstrapped standard
errors are in parenthesis. Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy,
and state fixed effects. Husbands and wives are aged 20-59. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, ***
denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table 1.6: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using Two-staged Least Squares
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Pooled
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0788*** 0.0876*** 0.105*** 0.127*** 0.135*** 0.129*** 0.153*** 0.113***
(0.0053) (0.0040) (0.0051) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0061) (0.0066) (0.0022)
Husband’s Wage -0.167*** -0.187*** -0.195*** -0.189*** -0.198*** -0.168*** -0.170*** -0.187***
(0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0017)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.254*** 0.283*** 0.375*** 0.395*** 0.485*** 0.526*** 0.669*** 0.399***
(0.0169) (0.0130) (0.0180) (0.0184) (0.0213) (0.0249) (0.0287) (0.0080)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.539*** -0.605*** -0.698*** -0.590*** -0.712*** -0.687*** -0.746*** -0.658***
(0.0125) (0.0129) (0.0164) (0.0146) (0.0174) (0.0202) (0.0219) (0.0062)
Cragg Donald Wald F statistic 7616.89 13184.84 5259.92 7666.83 6799.91 4636.17 4175.37 43632.41
Mean Values:
LFP of Wife 35.0 35.7 31.8 35.1 30.0 27.2 24.3 30.5
Wife’s Own Wage 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.3
Husband’s Wage 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.0
Observations 94594 104948 96675 108478 101313 87201 87995 681204
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages. Two hundred replications are carried out during the bootstrap. Each year’s
regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects. Bootstrapped
standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1
percent.
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Table 1.7: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, by Wives’ Education Groups
Dependent Variable: LFPw Not literate Literate
Below
Primary
Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0432*** 0.0377*** 0.0499*** 0.0579*** 0.0447*** 0.0252***
(0.00339) (0.00754) (0.00695) (0.00653) (0.00309) (0.00341)
Husband’s Wage -0.149*** -0.128*** -0.121*** -0.107*** -0.0645*** -0.0286***
(0.00188) (0.00362) (0.00304) (0.00317) (0.00262) (0.00519)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.121*** 0.147*** 0.220*** 0.314*** 0.261*** 0.0792***
(0.00950) (0.0296) (0.0308) (0.0359) (0.0182) (0.0108)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.419*** -0.498*** -0.536*** -0.582*** -0.377*** -0.0899***
(0.00524) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0170) (0.0153) (0.0163)
Observations 322,060 65,479 83,768 83,736 88,013 38,148
Notes: Two hundred replications are carried out during the bootstrap. Each column’s regression includes wife and husband age group
dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Each column’s wage imputation was carried
out separately for each spouse and education group, estimating participants’ wages on the above controls, and a vector of educational categories
× age categories. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent,
*** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table 1.8: Labor Force Participation by Wives’ Birth Cohorts
1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 N
1924-28 26.85 - 435
1929-33 31.65 30.51 5,122
1934-38 36.63 36.67 25.47 15,319
1939-43 38.6 38.13 31.63 27,048
1944-48 38.3 39.2 35.0 39.5 - 37,556
1949-53 36.3 38.7 35.6 34.9 28.5 25.5 51,732
1954-58 34.0 37.1 34.4 37.1 31.2 26.4 - 77,462
1959-63 30.5 33.4 33.0 37.8 32.4 29.7 23.9 103,906
1964-68 31.1 29.5 40.5 34.2 30.8 27.7 90,424
1969-73 27.4 38.8 34.2 31.2 29.1 83,476
1974-78 33.3 31.0 29.4 28.0 67,707
1979-83 27.5 25.7 24.6 23.4 71,524
1984-88 24.6 21.6 21.1 19.0 41,152
1989-93 20.08 15.29 8,341
Notes: Cells marked “-” have been omitted from being presented in the table because of very
small cell size. These are weighted LFP trends using NSS Sampling weights for the sample of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Primary Middle Secondary Graduate &
Above
1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Notes: The graph shows wives’ LFP by their own education for the sample of matched husband-
wife pairs, both aged 20-59. These observations are weighted using NSS sampling weights.
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Primary Middle Secondary Graduate &
Above
1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Notes: The graph shows wives’ LFP by their husband’s education for the sample of matched
husband-wife pairs, both aged 20-59. These observations are weighted using NSS sampling
weights.
36



























































































































Not literate Literate Below Primary Primary
Middle Secondary Graduate & Above
Total
Notes: Wages are wives’ weighted mean log real daily wage, summed over all reported activities
of regular salaried and casual wage employees. Wages are deflated using The World Bank’s
Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution is
trimmed.
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Not literate Literate Below Primary Primary
Middle Secondary Graduate & Above
Total
Notes: Wages are husbands’ weighted mean log real daily wage, summed over all reported activ-
ities of regular salaried and casual wage employees. Wages are deflated using The World Bank’s
Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution is
trimmed.
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Lowest 20% Second 20% Third 20% Fourth 20% Top 20%
Quintiles in Husband's Wage Distribution
1983 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Notes: Husbands’ wages are log real daily wages, summed over all reported activities of regular
salaried and casual wage employees. Wages are deflated using The World Bank’s Consumer Price
Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution is trimmed.
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Chapter 2
Selection And Women’s Wages
Over Time: Evidence From India
2.1 Introduction
Between 1983 and 2011, the average real wage increased by 149% and 55% for
Indian married women and men, respectively (Duraisamy 2002; Agrawal 2012; Mitra 2016;
Dasgupta and Goldar 2006).1 The growth in the wages was observed against the backdrop
of rapid economic growth (between 6% and 7% per year) as well as rising educational
attainment in India (Bosworth and Collins 2008).2 During the period 1983-2011, though
there was a decline in the labor force participation of married Indian women from 35% to
24%, their employment rate varied between 10% and 13%.
There are several potential reasons for the observed growth in women’s wages. One
reason is that women have made large improvements in human capital (e.g., education, ac-
tual experience) and occupational choices, which reflect their changed expectations about
the labor market and employment. Other reasons include changes in labor market institu-
1The wage statistics are based on change in daily wages denominated in Indian rupees. These data,
also used in the paper, come from India’s National Sample Survey. Section 2.5 provides a detailed data
description.
2Female literacy rose from 29.7% in 1981 to 65.4% in 2011. Male literacy rate rose from 56.3% in 1981
to 82.14% in 2011 (Office of Registrar General India, Census of India 2016).
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tions or demand that favor women relative to men, such as growth of the services sector
and increasing returns to soft-skills rather than hard-skills (Blau and Kahn 2006). However,
since wages are only observed for individuals who select into employment, an interesting
question is to what extent is the growth in wages and changes in gender wage gap reflect un-
observable changes in the selectivity of women’s workforce (Blau and Kahn 2006; Mulligan
and Rubinstein 2008; Blundell et al. 2007).
The impact of selection bias on women’s measured wages has been much discussed
in the literature. Conventional wisdom is that labor market participants are positively
selected, so average observed wages exceed average potential wages (Blundell et al. 2007;
Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008). However, the opposite scenario of negative selection may
be true if participants are negatively selected, for example, due to assortative mating (Neal
2004). Further, selection may not be constant over time (Mulligan and Rubinstein 2008;
Blau and Kahn 2006).
Although wages have been studied in the context of Mincerian returns to education
for India, my paper, to my knowledge, is the first to discuss how the change in observed
wages and gender wage gap reflects the changing composition of the female workforce. For
the analysis, I construct and use a unique sample of nationally representative, matched
husband-wife pairs, using India’s National Sample Survey’s (NSS) Employment Unemploy-
ment surveys, that span over an extensive time period of 1983 to 2011. NSS data, being
the primary source of data on the Indian labor market, allow me to clearly identify wage
employees, their wages and level of employment.
I follow Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) to study the change in standardized selec-
tion bias, which, by definition changes, because wives’ behavior has changed in terms of
the relationship between standardized wages and employment status. Section 2.3 of the
paper illustrates the Gronou-Heckman-Roy model to show how growing inequality within
gender can increase measured wages via a changing selection bias—even if the aggregate fe-
male employment rate is held constant—by changing the relative importance of market and
nonmarket factors for explaining which women are employed. Next, Section 2.4 explains
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the empirical framework, followed by Section 2.5, which describes NSS data and provides a
descriptive analysis. Section 2.6 shows how the Heckman two-step estimator, when applied
to Indian data, suggests that selection into the wives’ wage employment is consistently neg-
ative, however, is becoming less negative from -0.379 log points in 1983 to -0.181 log points
in 2011. In other words, the negative selection bias implies that the less-skilled wives are a
part of the wage earning female workforce, and that the average market wage of the wage-
earning wife is less than the average (potential) market wage of the non-employed wives.
In addition, I find that the gender wage gap (using two-step estimator) shows a moderate
increase (in absolute value) from a -0.455 to a -0.503 log wage point differential over study
period. Section 2.7 discusses the empirical findings of the paper, and Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
Economists have long been concerned about selection bias in observed wages and
gender pay gaps (Gronau 1973; Heckman 1974). One method is to study selection in
the literature is to use information on observed covariates and restrictions motivated by
economic models to impute values for the missing data (Blau and Kahn 2006; Neal 2004;
Olivetti and Petrongolo 2008). For example, Neal (2004) estimates the gap in potential
earnings between black and white women in the United States by fitting median regressions
on imputed wage distributions for women nonemployed in 1990. He finds that the gap
between potential earnings of white and black women is at least 60% higher than the gap
in actual earnings, thus revealing that black women are more positively selected into work
than white women.
Similarly, Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) analyze gender wage gaps correcting for
sample selection in the United States and Europe. The authors impute wages for those not
working by using observable characteristics to make assumptions on whether individuals
can be placed below or above median wages. In particular, they use panel data for the
years 1994-2001 to search backward and forward to recover individuals’ wage observations
42
from the nearest wave in the sample. They find higher median wage gaps on imputed rather
than actual wage distributions for most countries and across alternative imputations. In
addition, under their most conservative selection correction, sample selection into employ-
ment explains nearly half of the observed negative correlation between gender wage and
employment gaps.
Another approach acknowledges that selection can be based on unobservables and
models a correction procedure by including an extra term in the wage equation, the control
function, which is known in parametric selection models (Gronau 1973; Heckman 1974).
Recently, using such a parametric selection model (among other methods), Mulligan and
Rubinstein (2008) estimate that the gender wage gap in the U.S. remained stable at around
-0.34 log points between the late 1970s and late 1990s. They find female selection into
employment switched from negative to positive over this time period, which they interpret
as evidence that growing wage inequality within gender differentially induced more able
women to work. In addition, they argue that the narrowing of the gender wage gap can be
entirely attributed to unobservable changes in labor force composition. This paper follows
the theoretical and empirical framework of Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) to analyze the
trends in real wages and gender wage gap in India.
Although several studies discuss returns to schooling, they do not address the role of
selection bias, or the evolution of it over time, in the growth in wages in India. A study by
Duraisamy (2002) estimates returns to schooling in India in wage employment by gender,
age, and cohort for the year 1993. Correcting for selection bias, using household’s non-
labor income as an instrument, the research finds that returns to education increase up to
the secondary level and decline thereafter. Further, the returns to an additional year of
education are higher for women than men at the middle, secondary, and higher secondary
levels.
Dutta (2006) estimates the returns to education for two categories of wage employ-
ees, regular salaried and casual wage workers, for the years 1983, 1993, and 1999. Following
Lee (1983), her analysis corrects for selection bias using household’s demographic charac-
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teristics as instrumental variables. The study finds flat and U-shaped returns to education
for casual wage workers and regular salaried workers, respectively. In addition, there is
evidence of growing inequality within groups of workers with respect to their education
levels.
Recent work by Agrawal (2012) estimates returns to education separately for rural
and urban regions of India for 2004. The study corrects for selection bias, following Heckman
(1979), using household’s demographic characteristics and non-labor income as the exclusion
restrictions. The findings indicate that returns to education increase with the level of
education and differ for rural and urban residents. In addition, estimated returns are lower
at the bottom quantiles and are higher at the upper quantiles of the wage distribution
(Agrawal 2012; Singhari, Madheswaran, et al. 2016).
My paper’s contribution to the current literature is studying the Indian working
women’s wage growth, and how it reflects in part a changing composition of the female
workforce. I construct and use a unique sample of matched husband-wife pairs, incorporat-
ing employment and wage data from all reported activities over an extensive time period of
1983 to 2011. The next section uses the Gronou-Heckman-Roy (GHR) model to illustrate
how wage inequality within gender can increase the measured wages via a changing selection
bias. This approach of studying women’s labor supply behavior provides estimates, which
are comparable with previously documented estimates from other settings (Mulligan and
Rubinstein 2008; Blau and Kahn 2006).
2.3 Theoretical Framework
2.3.1 Relating Inequality Within Gender To Equality Between Genders
Following the previous literature and in particular, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008),
I have a log wage equation of the form
wit = µ
w






where wit represents person i’s potential log wage in year t, and gi represents his or her
gender (wives have g = 1, husbands have g = 0). µwt is treated as a constant representing
determinants of wages that common to all workers, such as the general levels of supply and
demand for human capital.3 γt may reflect a gap between the human capital of average
wife and the average husband, and/or differential market valuation of the average wife’s and
average husband’s human capital. Person i’s year t deviation from the average of persons
of his or her gender and observed characteristics is σwt ε
w
it.
It follows that γt is the average potential log wage of women minus the potential log
wage for men. The time series of γt is an indicator of wives’ wages even when the wives’
workforce is held constant. If measuring potential wages for husbands and wives regardless
of their employment status was possible, the average gender gap for each cross section
would be sufficient to calculate γt, because the cross-sectional average for wives would be
γt + µ
w
t and the cross-sectional average for husbands would be µ
w
t . The potential wage of
a person usually employed can be measured as her average daily earnings during the year.
For the moment, the potential wage of a person not usually employed may be interpreted
as the daily wage she would enjoy if she had worked. However, it is well recognized in labor
economics that the average wage of working women might not accurately measure the wage
of all women, because a sample of women do not work and they may not be a random
sample of the female population. The gender wage gap Gt among employed persons is
calculated by aggregating equation (2.1) by gender and then subtracting the male average
from the female average. We get
Gt = γt + σ
w
t bt, (2.2)
where lets ignore, for the sake of illustration, that some husbands may not be employed.
Let Lit be an indicator for whether person i is employed in year t. In equation (2.2),
bt ≡ E(εwit|gi = 1, Lit = 1), the expectation of the idiosyncratic component of wages for
3Later, as is treated by Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), µwt is a common function of demographic
characteristics, in which case µwt represents wage determinants for a particular group.
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employed wives. It differs from zero to the extent that non-employed wives have different
potential wages than employed wives. For this reason, bt is often referred to as a selection
bias; it depends on wives’ behavior in the sense that it is a function of which, and how
many, wives are employed.
The change in the measured gender gap over time can be represented as





Equation (2.3) has three terms. The first term is the change in the gender-specific compo-
nent of net labor demand, which may reflect changes in gender wage discrimination, changes
in the market valuation of wives’ relative skill endowment, or more rapid accumulation of
wives’ human capital. The second term captures the change in relative market valuation of
skill between the average working wife and the average wife. The last term, σwt ∆bt, is the
change in the standardized selection bias, which changes only because women’s behavior has
changed in terms of the relationship between standardized wages and employment status.
Using economic theory to understand changes in ∆bt, Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) use
Roy’s (1951) two-sector model as applied by Gronau (1973) and Heckman (1974), which is
described next.
2.3.2 The GHR Model For Repeated Cross Sections
As explained in Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), the GHR model adds to equation
(2.1) a non-market wage equation, a second ”reservation wage”, to predict which women
are employed. Hence, we have
wit = µ
w













where rit is the wife i’s date t log reservation wage. A wife i works at t if and only if
wit > rit, which means











The left-hand side of the inequality (2.5) is person-year specific, whereas the right-hand side
is common to all women in a given year. Thus, changes in labor supply have two sources:
(i) changes in the parameters affecting only the right-hand side and thereby affecting all
wives’ employment threshold uniformly, and (ii) changes in (σ
w
σr ) that affect the selection
rule for each wife in a way that depends on her own characteristics. It is assumed that the












where ρ is the cross-sectional correlation between log reservation and potential market
wages, assumed to be constant over time.4 As before, the gender gap, Gt is a linear function
of the bias bt, but bivariate normality implies a closed-form formula for the bias:
Gt = γt + σ
w
t bt, (2.7)






























where φ and Φ denote the density and cumulative distribution function, respectively, for the
standard normal distribution. The λt term is the inverse Mill’s ratio, and is a nonnegative
4Gronau (1973), Heckman (1979), and Borjas (1994) are among previous studies using the bivariate
normality assumption.
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and declining function of ζ, which is the common component of the employment threshold
transformed to a z-score. In contrast, the term σ
w
σr affects the selection rule, and therefore
both λ and squared-bracket term of the equation (2.8).
2.3.3 Inequality Affects the Selection Rule
The square bracket term in equation (2.8) is the correlation between the log market
wage w, and the net gain, w − r, from employment, and is therefore in the [-1,1] interval.
If ρ were positive and σw were small enough (σw < σrρ), then the selection bias would
be negative, despite the fact that the inverse Mills ratio is a nonnegative function. In this
case, it is said that ”selection into the workforce is negative” because the average market
wage of employed women is less than the average (potential) market wage of non-employed
women. As σw increases, the square bracket term becomes positive and approaches 1. This
means that an increase in σw might cause a fundamental behavior change, reversing an
initial situation in which low-wage women are employed to a situation in which high-wage
women are employed, even without any change in the total amount of wives’ employment.
In other words, nonwage factors r dominate wives’ employment decisions when σw is small,
but if σw increases enough, market wages can become unequal enough that they dominate
nonwage factors as employment determinants, so that nonworking wives tend to be the ones
with less wage potential.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the GHR model for a special case of when ρ = 1. The hor-
izontal axis measures nonmmarket productivity r, and the vertical axis measures market
productivity w. Any person above the 45-degree line is employed and vice-versa. Since r
and w are perfectly correlated in this case, all members of the population at a point in time
are represented by points on a single straight line whose slope is σ
w
σr . The dashed line crosses
the population line from above and shows the case when the less-skilled persons work or
when σw < σr. The measured average wage is the average among the working persons,
namely those along the dense part of the dashed line. If σw > σr, then the population line
crosses the 45-degree line from below and the more-skilled persons work, as shown by the
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solid line in the figure. In this case, the measured average wage is the average along the
dense part of the solid line. The figure shows that an increase in σw relative to σr shows a
dramatic change in measured market wages.
Comparative statics with respect to σ
w

































The first comparative static says that changing the selection rule by putting more weight
on a wife’s rank in the market wage distribution increases the standardized selection bias.
If the bias is negative, it becomes less negative. If it is positive, it becomes more positive.
The second comparative static can be positive or negative, depending on the relative size
of σw and σrρ. Changing parameters, σw and σw−σrρ, over time means that the selection
rule has changed.
2.3.4 The Employment Rate and Selection Rule as Separate Determi-
nants of Selection Bias
Equation (2.9) shows how the inverse Mills ratio λt is calculated as φ(ζt)/Φ(ζt),
where ζt depends on the mean net return to work. Also, φ(ζt) is the fraction Pt of persons
who work (i.e., satisfy the inequality (2.5)). Thus, the inverse Mills ratio λt varies over time
only to the extent that the employment rate Pt varies. The standardized selection bias can








t ) is shorthand notation for equation (2.8)’s square bracket term, which is
a function of σwt /σ
r
t . The function λ(Pt) is called as a control function (Heckman 2001).
Intuitively, the conditional expectation of b is related to the employment rate P because the
average worker has a different market wage than the marginal worker, where the marginal
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worker is added to the workforce by a change in the mean net benefit from working γt+µ
w
t −
µrt .The gap between the marginal and average worker becomes less relevant as P approaches
1, which is why λ′ < 0 and λ(1) = 0. The change over time in bt, the behavioral component



















The change in the selection bias is thus comprised of two terms, (i) change in the mean net
benefit from working, holding constant the selection rule, (ii) change in the selection rule.
A growing wage inequality over time implies that the second term will be positive because
λ is positive (for P < 1).
2.4 Empirical Specification
In the Heckman two-step model, demographic characteristics are assumed to lin-
early affect µwt and µ
r
t , but not affect ρ, σ
w
t , or σ
r
t . In particular, X is a row vector of
demographic characteristics affecting market wages, Z is the row vector X plus a vector of
additional demographic characteristics affecting only reservation wages. In addition, follow-
ing Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), I assume that selection bias is zero for husbands. For
purposes of estimation, the inequality (2.5) is estimated as a probit employment equation
for the wives by year,
Pt(Z) = Prob(L = 1|Z, g = 1) = φ(Zδt), (2.13)
where Pt(Z) is the wives’ employment rate and φ is the cumulative distribution function of
the standard normal distribution. A log market wage equation is estimated for employed
persons using
wit = Xitβt + giγt + giθtλ(Zitδt) + uit. (2.14)
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In equation (2.14), the vector X includes educational attainment dummies, an age quadratic
interacted with education dummies, and dummy variables for region, caste, and religion.
The vector Z has the same elements, plus state indicators, household size, and the number
of children in the household aged 0-4, 5-9, and 10-14. β and θ are coefficient vectors. The




it from equation (2.1) minus the
inverse Mills ratio term, θtλ. Further, given the strength of income effect caused by Indian
husbands’ wages, I additionally estimate equation (2.13), controlling for husbands’ actual
wages.
Following Gronau (1977), Heckman (1979), and Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008),
my estimation proceeds in two steps, hereafter as the Heckman two-step estimator, sep-
arately for every NSS cross section. First, I estimate Pt(Z) as the fitted values from the
probit equation above, estimated on the NSS sample of all prime-working-age wives. The
dependent variable for the probit is working as usually employed (described in section 2.5).
Second, for the sample of wives usually employed, the log wage equation 2.14 is estimated
using least squares, with a value for the inverse Mill’s ratio assigned to each person ac-
cording to the estimates from the probit equation. Standard errors are calculated with the
bootstrap method, and thereby account for the facts that estimation occurs in two stages
and that the regression equation error terms are heteroscedastic.
2.5 Data
The Employment and Unemployment Surveys of the National Sample Survey (NSS)
are the primary source of data for indicators of the Indian labor force.5 I use individual-
level data from seven cross sections of the NSS for the years 1983-84, 1987-88, 1993-94,
2004-05, 2007-08, 2009-10 and 2011-12.6 Each NSS survey covers around 500,000 persons
from 115,000 households.
A fundamental contribution of this paper is to study the growth in wages in India
5The Census of India is another source of workforce data, but the information is quite limited (Kasturi
2015; Hirway 1999). Section A.1 provides a discussion on Census and NSS estimates.
6For purposes of exposition, I refer to their first year for the remainder of the paper.
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using a unique sample of matched husband-wife pairs, which incorporates participation and
wage data from individuals’ all reported activities. In my sample, I include pairs where
both spouses live in the same household and are between the ages of 20 and 59.7 I match
spouses within a household using each member’s relationship to the household head.8 This
technique allows me to uniquely identify and classify 92% of the married individuals from
the master NSS data.
For the analysis, I use usual principal and subsidiary status (UPSS), collected by the
NSS, which captures the activity status of an individual during the year prior to the date of
survey.9 Following the activity status information provided by the NSS, I classify persons
as working or not working according to whether they are usually employed (i.e., regular
salaried or casual wage worker).10 My estimates of the wage equations further limit the
sample to persons working as usually employed in at least one of their reported activities,
excluding the self-employed; helpers in household enterprise; and persons with inconsistent
reports of earnings and employment status.11 I also trim wage outliers to calculate mean
wages and in the wage regressions.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for usually employed wives, the fraction of
which lies between 9 to 13% of all the wives in the matched husband-wife sample.12 The
final sample consists of 64,996 usually employed wives, aged between 20-59 years at the
time of the survey, from 1983 to 2011 covering all of India’s states and union territories.13
More than 74% of the usually employed wives reside in rural areas during all years of data.
Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribe wives, which are lower-caste persons, make up at least 41%
7The age restrictions are imposed to reduce bias resulting from decisions of higher education and retire-
ment on LFP.
8Refer to the Section A.2 for an explanation on the construction of the sample of matched husband-wife
pairs.
9NSS also classifies activities for the reference period of one week (called current weekly status) and
each day of the reference week (called current daily status). Compared to these, individual’s UPSS defined
activities are more stable, long-term, and thus more suitable for studying employment patterns.
10This differs from full time full year classification of Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), omitting hours and
weeks worked per year, which are not available in the NSS data.
11Of the 91,897 wives who were usually employed in at least one of their activities, 99% of them report
as usually employed (i.e., regular salaried or casual wage worker) in their first economic activity.
12See Table C1 for summary statistics on the full sample of 681,204 matched husband-wife pairs.
13Union territories are a type of administrative division in the Republic of India, ruled directly under by
the central government.
52
in each cross section. Eighty-nine percent of the usually employed wives report Hinduism
as their religion.14 The data provide evidence of declining fertility over the study period,
shown by falling average household size and number of children in a household. The mean
age of an usually employed wife is increasing from around 32.6 years in 1983 to 35.6 years in
2011. Between 1983 and 2011, wives’ mean log real daily wages increased from 3.67 to 4.63
log points.15 The data show a rise educational attainment for the usually employed wives,
with the proportion of illiterate wives falling from 84.1% in 1983 to roughly 46% in 2011.
The proportion of usually employed wives with a college degree, middle, and primary level
of education grew by 11 percentage points, 8 percentage points, and 7.5 percentage points,
respectively. This growth is closely followed by an increase in the proportion of wives who
are in literate below primary and secondary education levels by 6.5 percentage points and
5.4 percentage points, respectively.
Table 2.2 displays summary statistics for 263,211 usually employed husbands, aged
20-59 years at the time of the survey, between 1983-2011 from all Indian states and union
territories.16 Barring 1987, roughly 67-68% of the usually employed husbands reside in rural
areas. Approximately 33% of the usually employed husbands belong to Scheduled Caste-
Scheduled Tribe, the lower-caste households. Comparable to the wives, majority (84%) of
the usually employed husbands report Hinduism as their religion. The data show declining
average household size and number of children in the household between the years 1983
and 2011, as evidence of declining fertility. The mean age of an usually employed husband
is higher than that of wives, ranging between 37 to 39 years over the study period. The
data show an increase in husbands’ mean log real daily wages from 4.58 log points in 1983
14I include region, caste and religion variables as demographic explanatory variables to capture impacts of
culturally or religiously imposed restrictions on women (see, e.g., Klasen and Pieters 2015; Afridi et al. 2016;
Kapsos et al. 2014; Olsen and Mehta 2006).
15These are real log daily wages, summed over all reported activities, earned by usually employed wives
(regular salaried and casual wage workers). The daily wages have been deflated using the World Bank’s
Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution are trimmed
to avoid outliers.
16See Table 1.1 for summary statistics on the full sample of 681,204 matched husband-wife pairs. The
fraction of usually employed husbands of all the husbands in the matched husband-wife sample fluctuates
between the lowest 16.5% in 1987 to the highest of roughly 47% in 2009. Data for the year 1987 suffer from
an issue of missing wages for about 51% of the usually employed husbands (i.e, regular salaried and casual
wage workers).
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to 5.16 log points in 2011. The overall educational attainment of the usually employed
husbands rose over the study period. The data show a decline in the proportion of illiterate
usually employed husbands, falling from 43.7% in 1983 to 25% in 2011. At the same time,
the proportion of usually employed husbands who have middle, secondary, and a college
degree grew by 5.4 percentage points, 5.5 percentage points, and 8.6 percentage points,
respectively.
Finally, it is worth noting the change in wages by each gender’s education groups
in India over the study period. Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show that between 1983-2011, both
husbands and wives experienced growth in median log real daily wages.17 Separating wages
by wives’ education group, Figure 2.2 shows rising wages for wives in all education levels,
except the secondary level, which shows a decline of 1.16 log points over the study period.
Wives in the lower end of the education distribution experienced the most growth in their
wages, which increased to 4.43 log points in 2011.
In comparison to wives’ wages, Figure 2.3 shows that husbands earn relatively higher
log real daily wages across all education groups. Illiterate husbands also experienced the
most growth in their wages, which increased from 3.9 log points in 1983 to 4.8 log points
in 2011. The data show a growth in wages for husbands in literate below primary, primary,
and at least graduate education levels by 0.5 log points, 0.35 log points, and 0.17 log points,
respectively. Similar to wives, husbands in the secondary level of education also experienced
a decline in their wages by 0.42 log points over the study period.
I follow Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) to measure gender equality as the log of
the median daily wages of usually employed wives as a ratio of the median daily wages of
usually employed husbands. Barring 1987, Figure 2.4 shows a relatively flat gender equality
until 2004, which increased from -0.69 in 1983 to -0.71 log points in 2004. However, the
series then rose as the gender equality declined from -0.62 log points in 2007 to -0.54 log
points in 2009, and finally to -0.56 log points in 2011. In addition, Figure 2.4 presents the
17These are real log daily wages, summed over all reported activities, earned by wage employees (regular
salaried and casual wage workers). The daily wages have been deflated using the World Bank’s Consumer
Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution are trimmed to avoid
outliers.
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evolution of inequality within gender, measured as the log of the 90th percentile divided by
the 10th percentile in the wage distribution of each year. The figure shows that the wage
inequality for husbands is higher than of the wives during the study period. Further, until
2004, the data show a similar trend in the wage inequality series for both husbands and
wives. However, between 2004 and 2011, wage inequality for husbands declines from 2.08
log points to 1.8 log points. At the same time, wage inequality for wives falls from 1.56 log
points in 2004 to 1.39 log points in 2007, and finally growing to 1.78 in 2011.
Given the background of rising educational attainment along with growing wages
for both husbands and wives, it is important to consider if these rising wages may be
because of increased positive selection. The next section presents estimation results for
each cross section of NSS for husbands, wives, and the gender wage gap, after correcting
for selection bias using Heckman (1979) two-step estimator. The Heckman (1979) two-step
estimator is derived from the GHR model, as explained in Section 2.3, with a bivariate
normal distribution.
2.6 Estimation Results
Table 2.3 displays the results based on the log wage regressions estimated, separately
for each spouse and year, using the Heckman two-step and ordinary least squares.18 For
reference, for the wife, the first row displays OLS predicted wages, whereas panels A and
B display two-step predicted wages—which differ from one another based on the inclusion
of husbands’ actual wages in equation (2.13).19 OLS estimates of wives’ predicted wages
show an increase from 3.79 log points in 1983 to 4.69 log points in 2011. In contrast, Panel
A’s two-step estimates of wives’ predicted wages show that if every wife in the working
age population was in wage employment, the average predicted wage increased from 4.17
log points in 1983 to 4.87 log points in 2011. The selection bias in wives’ predicted wages
18See Appendix tables C2, C3, C4, C5, and C6 for the full results of the log wage regressions. In addition,
the employment probit results from equation (2.13) are displayed in Appendix tables C7, C8, and C9.
19In particular, column 2’s Heckman 2-step estimates include husbands’ actual wages as a control in the
wives’ first-stage employment estimation. Following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), I assume selection bias
is zero for husbands.
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represents the difference in average wage of usually employed wives and the average wage
of all wives, if all wives were in wage employment. As a result, the estimated bias in the
wives’ wages is consistently negative over the study period, but it becomes less negative
over time, changing from -0.38 log points in 1983 to -0.18 log points in 2011. In other words,
the negative selection bias implies that the less-skilled wives are a part of the wage earning
workforce, and that the average market wage of the usually employed wife is less than the
average (potential) market wage of the non-employed wives.
Table 2.3’s Panel B displays the results of wives’ log wage regressions, estimated us-
ing Mulligan and Rubinstein’s (2008) methodology—estimating equations (2.13) and (2.14),
assuming zero selection bias for husbands. In contrast to Panel A’s two-step estimated
wages, the two-step estimated wives’ predicted wages in Panel B are much lower. However,
they show a similar increasing trend over the study period, increasing from 3.885 log points
in 1983 to 4.671 log points in 2011. As a result, the selection bias between average wage
of wage-earning wives and average wage of all wives corrected for selection changes from
negative to positive over the study period. The results show a change in wives’ behavior in
terms of the relationship between their standardized wages and employment status, as the
estimated selection bias changed from -0.095 in 1983 to 0.0185 in 2011. This change in the
sign of the selection bias could reflect a fundamental behavioral change, reversing an initial
situation in which low-wage wives are employed to a situation in which high-wage wives are
employed, even without much change in the total amount of wives’ employment. Therefore,
as noted in Section 2.3.3 Equation (2.10), the period of negative selection bias between the
years 1983-2007 could be represented by the dashed line in the figure 2.1. However, if σw
increased enough over time to change the sign of σw − σrρ, the solid line in the figure 2.1
could represent the wives’ labor market for the years 2009-2011.
Finally, Table 2.3’s last three rows present the results from husbands’ log wage
regressions, estimated using OLS and Heckman two-step. Husbands’ predicted wages from
both the methods display a similar rising trend between 1983 and 2011. The OLS estimates
of husbands’ predicted wages show an increase from 4.62 log points in 1983 to 5.37 log
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points in 2011. Heckman two-step estimates of husbands’ predicted wages are similar to the
OLS estimates, showing an increase from 4.62 log points in 1983 to 5.36 log points in 2011.
Therefore, the selection bias in husbands’ wages, understood as the difference between the
average wage of wage earning husbands and the average wage of all husbands corrected for
selection into wage employment, is strictly positive. The selection bias in husbands’ wages
shows a moderate increase from 0.0063 log points in 1983 to 0.0184 log points in 2011.
Table 2.4 shows the evolution of the gender-wage gap in India over time. For ref-
erence, the OLS entries in the table are the difference between (a) wives’ predicted wages
from the wives’ log wage regression (without the inverse Mills ratio) for the relevant year
and (b) husbands’ predicted wages from husbands’ log wage regression for the relevant year.
As displayed in the Table 2.4, the OLS estimated gender wage gap, showing results without
correcting for selection, falls from -0.833 log wage points differential in 1983 to -0.685 log
wage points differential in 2011. Panel A’s estimated gender wage gap uses Table 2.3’s Panel
A’s wives’ predicted wages (including the effect of husbands’ wages in employment probit)
and husbands’ OLS predicted wages. The results show that controlling for selection and the
effect of husbands’ wages in wives’ employment, the gender wage gap is much lower than
the OLS estimates. Further, it shows a moderate increase (in absolute value) from a -0.455
to a -0.503 log wage point differential over the years 1983 to 2011. As a result, the bias
between the OLS predicted gender wage gap and two-step predicted wage gap is negative
over the study period, falling (in absolute value) from -0.379 in 1983 to -0.181 in 2011.
Similarly, Table 2.4’s Panel B’s estimated gender wage gap uses Table 2.3’s Panel
B’s wives’ predicted wages (following Mulligan and Rubinstein’s (2008) methodology) and
husbands’ OLS predicted wages. In contrast to panel A, the two-step estimated gender
wage gap in Panel B shows a -0.74 log wage point differential in 1983, falling moderately
(in absolute value) to a -0.703 log wage point differential in 2011. As a result, the bias in
the gender wage gap between the OLS and two-step estimates changes from negative to
positive over the study period, increasing from -0.095 in 1983 to 0.019 in 2011.
Measuring wages for the usually employed husbands may also be subject to selection
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bias, because the proportion of usually employed husbands is significantly less than 100%
(e.g., 39.7% in 1983 and 45.4% in 2011). Growing wage inequality would increase the
importance of market wages for selecting husbands into the workforce, and so the amount
of selection bias could have changed for them too, thereby possibly offsetting some of the
selection bias change for wives. Thus, one correction would be to account for husbands’
selection-bias growth by adding the inverse Mills ratio to the husbands wage regressions
(derived from husbands’ probit equations with the same explanatory variables as the wage
equation). Therefore, Table 2.4’s Panel C shows the gender wage gap estimated using Table
2.3’s Panel B’s wives’ two-step predicted wages and husbands’ two-step estimated predicted
wages. The two-step estimated gender wage gap, after correcting for selection in both
husbands and wives, changes from a -0.732 to -0.685 log wage point differential between
1983-2011. This also implies a change in the selection bias from -0.101 log points in 1983
to -0.06 log points in 2007, and finally to 0.007 log points and 0.000 log points in 2009 and
2011, respectively.
2.7 Discussion
An approach to understanding trends in selection bias is to examine how abil-
ity—a trait that has been shown to directly affect wages—affects selection into employment
(Kuhn and Weinberger 2005; Fortin 2008; Herrmann and Machado 2012a). Herrmann
and Machado (2012b), carrying out a complementary analysis to Mulligan and Rubinstein
(2008), examine how cognitive ability affects selection into employment and how this rela-
tionship has changed over time. Measuring ability using high school test scores, the authors
find that differential selection on the ability of female labor market participants is unlikely
to explain the entire convergence of the measured gender wage gap in the United States.
Unfortunately, NSS do not collect information on measures of ability such as individuals’
test scores or quality of schooling, which makes it impossible to test this hypothesis in In-
dian data. However, both observation and economic theory suggest that women’s growing
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attachment to the workforce should have induced them to invest more in skills rewarded in
the marketplace, because the return-to-skill investment increases with the number of hours
during which the skills are utilized (see, e.g., Becker 1985; Goldin and Katz 2002). Because
human capital investment is complementary to a labor force attachment, investment may
respond to a changing selection rule, and the selection rule might change in response to a
general increase in the returns to investment to the extent that returns to investment might
vary across women. Nevertheless, the lesson from the wage evidence presented in this paper
is that Indian wives’ measured wages may have grown because they behave differently than
they used to in terms of labor supply, labor force attachment, human capital investment,
or some combination of these factors.
To recap, an important conclusion from the GHR model is that selection could be
negative: the female workforce could have less skill than the female population. Another
conclusion is that an increase in the return to human capital may affect the supply of skilled
women proportionally more than it does the supply of unskilled women. If so, then the skill
composition of the female workforce will be greater than it used to be if skill were a fixed
factor at the individual level. To illustrate possible negative selection, following Mulligan
and Rubinstein (2008), I present some nonwage evidence on the changing composition of
the female workforce, as discussed next.
Figure 2.5 displays the employment rates of wives as a function of their husband’s
position in the wage distribution. The first step is to estimate a probit equation in my
NSS sample of matched husband-wife pairs, controlling for wife’s age quadratic, wife’s ed-
ucational attainment dummies, wife’s education interacted with the age quadratic, region,
religion, caste, state indicators, household size, children, and dummies indicating the hus-
band’s quartile in the daily wage distribution of husbands his age in the relevant year.
For the average value of the wives’ regressors, I calculate a fitted value at the means from
the probit for each husband’s quartile. To determine whether a quartile’s employment
rate increased in greater or lesser proportion than the rate for the general population, this
predicted employment rate is divided by the predicted employment rate for the same re-
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gressors from a probit equation that does not include the husband-quartile dummies. The
figure shows wives with husbands earning low wages (the bottom two quartiles) have much
higher employment rates than the average wives in each year. At the same time, wives with
husbands earning high wages have lower employment rates, quite similar to the average
employment rates (barring the year 1987). The fact that the lower lines slope up, and the
higher lines slope down, is consistent with the hypothesis that selection has become less
negative over time, so that women with relatively high earnings potential have increased
their workforce representation over time.
2.8 Conclusion
Between 1983 and 2011, the average real wage increased by 149% and 55% for Indian
married women and men, respectively. At the same time, there was rapid economic growth
(between 6% and 7% per year) as well as rising educational attainment in India. This
paper documents the trends in wages and employment for Indian wives and husbands over
the years 1983-2011 to answer the question—is the rise in wages due to increased positive
selection?
This paper is the first, to my knowledge, to study how the change in observed wages
and gender wage gap reflects the changing composition of the female workforce. Following
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008), I illustrate the Gronou-Heckman-Roy model and imple-
ment the Heckman’s two-step estimator in the empirical analysis. The evidence presented
in this paper suggests that wives’ measured wages have grown in large part because of a
change in their behavior towards factors like labor supply, labor force attachment, and hu-
man capital investment. The Heckman two-step estimator, when applied to Indian data,
suggests that selection into the wives’ wage employment is consistently negative, however,
is becoming less negative from -0.379 log points in 1983 to -0.181 log points in 2011. The
negative selection bias implies that the less-skilled wives are a part of the wage earning
female workforce, and that the average market wage of the wage-earning wife is less than
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the average (potential) market wage of the non-employed wives. In addition, I find that
the gender wage gap (using the two-step estimator) shows a moderate increase (in absolute
value) from a -0.455 to a -0.503 log wage point differential over study period.
Heckman’s two-step control function method is one of the repeated cross-sectional
methods suggested in the economic literature to measure the change in selection bias over
time in an environment in which the selection rule changes over time. Following the liter-
ature, I use number of children in the household as the instrumental variable, that affects
selection but not wages. However, one shortcoming of this method in repeated cross sec-
tions is the lack of information on historical work experience that has been shown to be
important for determination of wages and gender wage gap (Mincer and Polachek 1974;
O’Neill and Polachek 1993). I leave it to future research to address the lack of information
on historical work experience as well as human capital investment as determinants of wages
and unobserved selection.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Usually Employed Wives
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Total
Demographic Characteristics:
Rural 83.49 79.62 83.27 81.62 81.83 79.4 74.45 80.33
Caste: SC-ST 45.8 43.1 44.72 45.13 45.24 43.81 40.76 44.05
Religion: Hindu 89.76 89.3 90.8 89.94 89.72 89.98 89.25 89.84
Mean Household Size 5.35 5.27 5.00 4.99 4.86 4.81 4.72 4.95
Mean Number of Kids in the HH (aged 0-4) 0.75 0.72 0.63 0.49 0.44 0.39 0.35 0.50
Mean Number of Kids in the HH (aged 5-9) 0.83 0.80 0.71 0.64 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.62
Mean Number of Kids in the HH (aged 10-14) 0.68 0.62 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.58 0.62
Wife’s Characteristics:
Age 32.66 32.65 33.29 34.73 35.13 35.46 35.64 34.52
Log Daily Wage 3.67 3.86 4.00 4.16 4.34 4.49 4.63 4.24
Education:
Not Literate 84.19 80.13 77.31 64.63 58.65 51.44 45.73 62.95
Literate Below Primary 4.53 4.82 6.48 8.9 9.47 11.73 11.1 8.79
Primary 3.59 3.93 4.9 7.92 10.72 11.87 11.13 8.51
Middle 1.57 2.01 2.71 5.42 7.43 8.29 9.51 5.95
Secondary 4.09 5.28 4.68 5.34 5.97 7.29 9.5 6.26
Graduate & Above 2.03 3.82 3.91 7.78 7.76 9.38 13.03 7.53
Observations 9,846 8,094 9,840 10,637 10,891 8,061 7,627 64,996
Notes: Summary statistics using NSS data and NSS sampling weights. These are usually employed wives, aged 20-59, from the sample of matched
husband-wife pairs. SC-ST refers to scheduled caste-scheduled tribe, the economically backward sections of the society. HH refers to household.
Log Daily Wage are wives’ weighted mean log real daily wage, summed over all reported activities of regular salaried and casual wage employees.
Wages are deflated using The World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the wage distribution is
trimmed.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics for Usually Employed Husbands
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Total
Demographic Characteristics:
Rural 67 22.53 68.79 68.77 68.98 68.29 66.37 66.2
Caste: SC-ST 33.16 20.35 34.6 35.86 36.31 35.69 33.78 34.46
Religion: Hindu 84.51 83.77 85.49 84.22 84.13 83.55 83.79 84.15
Mean Household Size 5.65 5.42 5.23 5.25 5.11 4.98 4.91 5.14
Mean Number of Kids in the HH (aged 0-4) 0.86 0.72 0.73 0.64 0.58 0.52 0.50 0.61
Mean Number of Kids in the HH (aged 5-9) 0.82 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.61
Mean Number of Kids in the HH (aged 10-14) 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.57 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.56
Husband’s Characteristics:
Age 37.21 38.21 37.67 38.11 38.45 38.56 38.60 38.23
Log Daily Wage 4.58 5.34 4.74 4.88 4.98 5.08 5.16 4.97
Education:
Not Literate 43.76 21.1 40.05 32.66 29.28 26.67 25.03 30.74
Literate Below Primary 12.7 11.05 13.27 11.76 10.95 11.51 11.82 11.82
Primary 13.37 15.05 11.55 13.36 15.1 14.58 13.39 13.77
Middle 10.61 13.76 11.34 14.89 16.55 16.64 16.04 14.9
Secondary 13.13 24.67 15.16 15 15.92 17.52 18.67 16.66
Graduate & Above 6.43 14.36 8.62 12.32 12.2 13.07 15.05 12.1
Observations 37,836 21,640 40,051 42,377 44,206 38,366 38,735 263,211
Notes: Summary statistics using NSS data and NSS sampling weights. These are usually employed husbands, aged 20-59, from the sample of
matched husband-wife pairs. SC-ST refers to scheduled caste-scheduled tribe, the economically backward sections of the society. HH refers to
household. Log Daily Wage refers to husbands’ weighted mean log real daily wage, summed over all reported activities of regular salaried and
casual wage employees. Wages are deflated using The World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the
wage distribution is trimmed.
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Table 2.3: Selection Bias Correction Using the Heckman Two-Step Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Predicted Wages 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
OLS 3.791*** 3.976*** 4.192*** 4.286*** 4.441*** 4.638*** 4.690***
(0.00895) (0.00950) (0.00781) (0.00718) (0.00708) (0.00881) (0.00825)
Panel A: Including Husbands’ Actual Wages in Wives’ Employment Probit, in Z
Two-Step 4.169*** 4.795*** 4.461*** 4.571*** 4.643*** 4.819*** 4.871***
(0.0131) (0.0256) (0.0103) (0.0115) (0.00897) (0.0122) (0.0124)
Wife Bias -0.379*** -0.819*** -0.268*** -0.285*** -0.202*** -0.181*** -0.181***
(0.0107) (0.0234) (0.00910) (0.00986) (0.00760) (0.0104) (0.0105)
Panel B: Following Mulligan, Assuming Zero Selection Bias for Husbands
Two-Step 3.885*** 4.056*** 4.249*** 4.341*** 4.486*** 4.616*** 4.671***
(0.00999) (0.0124) (0.0100) (0.00873) (0.00811) (0.0109) (0.0105)
Bias -0.0948*** -0.0804*** -0.0568*** -0.0546*** -0.0454*** 0.0218*** 0.0185***
(0.00651) (0.00824) (0.00659) (0.00566) (0.00460) (0.00642) (0.00653)
OLS 4.624*** 5.038*** 4.894*** 5.086*** 5.094*** 5.329*** 5.374***
(0.00404) (0.00846) (0.00390) (0.00337) (0.00311) (0.00351) (0.00360)
Husband Two-Step 4.618*** 4.946*** 4.887*** 5.075*** 5.082*** 5.315*** 5.356***
(0.00424) (0.00959) (0.00417) (0.00345) (0.00314) (0.00364) (0.00363)
Bias 0.00631*** 0.0915*** 0.00716*** 0.0111*** 0.0125*** 0.0144*** 0.0184***
(0.00165) (0.00636) (0.00153) (0.00123) (0.00103) (0.00115) (0.00104)
Notes: Each table entry summarizes regression results (reported in full in the Appendix). Panel A and B show predicted log waves for wives,
where panel A (column 2) includes husbands’ actual wages as an additional control in the wives’ first-stage LFP estimation and Panel B’s
(column 5) estimation follows the methodology of Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008). The individual entries are predicted log wages for wives
(columns 1-6) and husbands (columns 7-9), which differ from each other in terms of (a) rows, i.e., the year used for estimation; (b) columns,
i.e., whether the regression includes the inverse Mills ratio (OLS does not include it, 2-step does). The bias column (3,6, and 9) is the difference
between the OLS and two-step columns.
The regressions control for demographics, are carried out separately for each gender and year, and use the sample of usually employed persons
from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Five hundred replications are carried out in the bootstrap.
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Table 2.4: Correcting the Gender Wage Gap Using the Heckman Two-Step Estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Gender Wage Gap 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
OLS -0.833*** -1.062*** -0.702*** -0.800*** -0.654*** -0.691*** -0.685***
(0.00931) (0.0125) (0.00776) (0.00728) (0.00736) (0.00903) (0.00856)
Panel A: Including Husbands’ Actual Wages in Wives’ Employment Probit
Two-step -0.455*** -0.242*** -0.433*** -0.515*** -0.452*** -0.511*** -0.503***
(0.0129) (0.0265) (0.00978) (0.0111) (0.00904) (0.0121) (0.0125)
Bias -0.379*** -0.819*** -0.268*** -0.285*** -0.202*** -0.181*** -0.181***
(0.0107) (0.0234) (0.00910) (0.00986) (0.00760) (0.0104) (0.0105)
Panel B: Following Mulligan, Assuming Zero Selection Bias for Husbands
Two-step -0.739*** -0.981*** -0.645*** -0.746*** -0.608*** -0.713*** -0.703***
(0.0104) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.00884) (0.00850) (0.0111) (0.0107)
Bias -0.0948*** -0.0804*** -0.0568*** -0.0546*** -0.0454*** 0.0218*** 0.0185***
(0.00651) (0.00824) (0.00659) (0.00566) (0.00460) (0.00642) (0.00653)
Panel C: Correcting for Selection in Both Husbands and Wives
Two-step -0.732*** -0.890*** -0.638*** -0.735*** -0.596*** -0.699*** -0.685***
(0.0105) (0.0158) (0.0102) (0.00885) (0.00851) (0.0112) (0.0106)
Bias -0.101*** -0.172*** -0.0640*** -0.0657*** -0.0579*** 0.0074 0.0000
(0.00636) (0.0102) (0.00665) (0.00563) (0.00453) (0.00650) (0.00648)
Notes: Each table entry summarizes regression results from log wage regressions of wives and husbands. Gender wage gap is measured as the
difference between the wives’ predicted wages and the husbands’ predicted wages for the relevant year and method (i.e., OLS or Two-Step).
The Bias column is the difference between the OLS and 2-step columns. Panel A shows the gender wage gap, assuming no selection bias for
husbands, after including husbands’ actual wages in wives’ first-stage LFP estimation. Panel B follows Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) to
estimate the gender wage gap, also assuming zero selection bias for husbands. Panel C corrects for selection bias in husbands’ wages and
estimates the gender wage gap.
The regressions control for demographics, are carried out separately for each gender and year, and use the sample of usually employed husbands
and wives from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Five hundred replications are carried out in the bootstrap.
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Figure 2.1: GHR Model: Inequality has Composition Effects on Measured Wages
Notes: The figure illustrates a comparative static for the Gronau-Heckman-Roy model with
respect to σw; σw(σr) denotes the standard deviation of market (reservation) wages. The 45-
degree line partitions market workers from nonworkers. The thicker line represents workers, when
σw > σr, and the dashed line represents when σw < σr.
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Not literate Literate below primary Primary Middle Secondary Graduate & above Total
Notes: Wages are wives’ weighted median log real daily wage, summed over all reported activities
of usually employed wives (i.e., regular salaried and casual wage employees). Wages are deflated
using The World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1%
of the wage distribution is trimmed.
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Not literate Literate below primary Primary Middle Secondary Graduate & above Total
Notes: Wages are husbands’ weighted median log real daily wage, summed over all reported
activities of usually employed husbands (i.e., regular salaried and casual wage employees). Wages
are deflated using The World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and
highest 1% of the wage distribution is trimmed.
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Husband-Wage Inequality Wife-Wage Inequality Gender Equality
Notes: The figure graphs time series of (a) gender equality, the log of the ratio of median wage of
an usually-employed wife to median wage of an usually-employed husband (right scale), (b) the
log of the ratio of an usually employed husband at the 90th percentile to that at 10th percentile
of the wage distribution (left scale), and (c) the log of the ratio of an usually employed wife at
the 90th percentile to that at 10th percentile of the wage distribution (left scale).
Wages are individuals’ weighted median log real daily wage, summed over all reported activities
of usually employees (i.e., regular salaried and casual wage employees). Wages are deflated using
The World Bank’s Consumer Price Index (base=2010) series. Lowest 1% and highest 1% of the
wage distribution is trimmed.
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Bottom Quartile Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Top Quartile
Notes: The figure graphs four time series of a group’s employment rate as a ratio of the em-
ployment rate of all wives in the NSS sample of matched husband-wife pairs. The groups differ
according to the husband’s position in the distribution of wages of husbands aged 20-59. The





Appendix A Data Overview
A.1 An Overview of NSS Estimates for India
NSS surveys and the decennial Census are the two major sources of the workforce in
India. Compared to the census population or the projections thereof, the NSS estimates of
population are, in general, on the lower side. This difference may arise due to the differences
in methods and coverage adopted by the NSS in comparison with the census operation (NSS
62nd Report, NSS 2005). NSS and Census estimates have been deemed broadly compatible
as both divide the country into rural and urban in a mutually consistent manner, and both
use the same reference period of one year for providing employment data (Kasturi 2015;
Thorat 2004; Hirway 1999). For example, Kasturi (2015) compares worker population
ratios between NSS (1993-94) and Census 1991, between NSS (1999-00) and Census 2001,
and between NSS (2011-12) and Census 2011. She finds that though the worker population
ratios have historically been higher under the NSS, the difference has narrowed for 2011
mainly due to the expansion of the definition of economic activity by the Census. In
conclusion, NSS statistics are better able to capture “workers” and provide more detailed
information on the workforce than the Census.
Table A1 summarizes the data from NSS Employment & Unemployment surveys
between 1983 and 2011. These statistics are weighted using NSS sampling weights to provide
nationally representative information. Further, these summary statistics are consistent with
the official Government of India reports on employment and unemployment statistics. Table
A1 shows an increase in India’s population from 682 million individuals in 1983 to 1088.27
million individuals in 2011. 70% of the individuals in the population reside in rural areas.
Hinduism is the majority religion of the population. The proportion of the population
belonging to the Scheduled Caste-Scheduled tribe has increased from 25.4% in 1983 to 27.5%
in 2011. Consistent with the Census reports, the table shows declining average household
size and the average number of kids in a household as indicators of declining fertility. The
table also presents a break up of the population by their age group. The proportion of the
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individuals belonging to the prime working age (20 to 59 years old) has grown from 44% in
1983 to about 52% in 2011. Since the prime paper focus of the paper is on wives aged 20-
59, the table provides additional demographic information for the working age population.
The working-age population resides in predominantly rural areas and is comprised of 50%
males. The majority of the women belonging to the working age population are married,
their proportion constant at a high 86% every survey year. The proportion of married
males remains high, as well, ranging from 78% to 81% over the study period. As evidence
towards rising educational attainment, the table shows rising literacy rates for both males
and females in the working age population.
Figure A1 presents a comparison of LFP for females, aged 20-59 by their marital
status. The figure shows a decline in LFP of married females from 35.2% in 1983 to 24.6%
in 2011. We can see the low and declining LFP of married females has dampened the level
and growth of the overall LFP, causing the overall female LFP to decline from 37.1% in
1983 to 27.3% in 2011. In comparison, single women comprising of never-married and wid-
owed/divorced women have higher levels of LFP. The figure shows the LFP of never-married
women as increased from 39.3% in 1983 to 41.4% in 2004, finally falling to 32.9% in 2011.
At the same time, LFP of widowed/divorced women was 52% in 1983, increasing to 57.7%
in 2004, and falling to 55.4% in 2011. However, the proportion of never-married women in
the working age population is low, ranging from 4% in 1983 to 7.5% in 2011. Similarly, the
proportion of widowed or divorced females (aged 20-59) is low, falling from 10% in 1983 to
7% in 2011.
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Table A1: A Snapshot of India
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Total
Rural 76.2 77.4 75.2 74.5 73.7 72.7 71.2 73.3
Caste: Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribe 25.4 26.1 26.8 28.1 28.3 28.5 27.5 27.4
Religion: Hindu 83.31 82.69 83.38 81.83 81.98 82.29 81.37 82.3
Mean Household Size 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.6
Mean Number of Kids in a Household 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.6
Age Distribution:
Below 20 Years 49.49 48.24 46.05 43.5 41.95 40.71 39.89 43.68
20-59 Years 44.02 45.36 47.32 49.3 50.55 51.39 51.94 49.03
60 & Above 6.48 6.39 6.63 7.19 7.5 7.9 8.17 7.29
Working Age Population (20-59 Years):
Rural 74.8 76.0 73.7 72.1 71.2 70.4 68.8 71.9
Male 50.4 50.6 50.5 50.2 50.0 50.2 50.1 50.2
Married Male 80.7 80.9 80.3 79.1 78.4 78.3 77.9 79.1
Married Female 85.5 85.8 86.4 86.0 85.7 85.6 85.7 85.8
Literate Male 57.9 60.1 65.4 73.7 76.9 78.9 79.8 72.2
Literate Female 27.6 30.5 36.7 48.7 53.6 57.3 60.0 47.7
Weighted N Individuals (in million) 682.01 713.40 777.60 971.92 1009.27 1020.52 1088.27 6262.99
Weighted N Households(in million) 133.93 142.64 162.96 207.15 222.54 231.11 250.37 1350.72
Notes: Summary statistics using NSS data and NSS sampling weights.
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Married All Never married Widowed/Divorced
Notes: The graph shows LFP of all Indian females, aged 20-59, by their marital status. These
observations are weighted using NSS sampling weights.
75
A.2 Matched Husband-Wife Pairs
For the analysis of female labor force participation(LFP), I construct a sample of
matched husband-wife pairs using NSS data. Since NSS do not provide spouse identification
numbers, I use information on each household member’s relationship to the household’s
head to match pairs. I include couples where both husband and wife are living in the same
household and are between the ages of 20 and 59. NSS interviews the head of the household
and reports the following categories for household’s each member’s relationship to the head:
spouse of the head, married child, spouse of married child, unmarried child, grandchild,
parent or parent in law of the head, sibling or sibling-in-law of the head, and servants or
employees. I am able to uniquely identify and classify 92% of the married individuals from
the master NSS data. I include couples where one member is a married head and has their
spouse present in the household. I also include couples where one member is the head’s
married child and has their spouse in the household. However, couples in households with
only one pair of prior generation married couples are included to avoid incorrect matching of
partners. Similarly, couples in households with only one pair of the head’s married brother
or sister are included. For example, it was difficult to correctly identify links in households
where more than two couples of married child and spouses live. Similarly, it was difficult to
correctly identify married couples in households where more than one married brother (or
sister) lived along with their spouse.
Of these 681,204 matched couples, 78% of them are husbands and wives where the
husband is the head of the household. 19.4% of them are couples where the husband is a
married child of the household’s head with the spouse residing in the same household. 0.2%
of the sample consists of husbands and wives, where the wife is the head of the household.
0.6% of the sample comprises of couples where the wife is the married daughter of the
household’s head with her husband residing in the same household. The remaining sample
consists of couples of prior generation married male and females (about 0.2%) and couples
of married sister or brother of the household’s head (about 1.8%).
My final sample of 681,204 matched husband-wife pairs also incorporates participa-
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tion and wage information overall reported activities of the individuals. Table A2 presents
a comparison of mean log real daily wages for husbands and wives from just the first re-
ported activity and their total wages overall reported activities. We can see that total
wages, overall activities, provide us with a more accurate measure of individuals’ earnings,
better than studying just their first reported activity. This is especially important in cases
when workers may report being unpaid helpers in their first activity(without any reported
wages) but may be involved in a wage paid activity (part time or full time) such as a casual
wage worker in a subsequently reported activity. The table presents mean wages along with
t-test values for a difference in their means. The difference in means of wages is statistically
different from zero for all years at the 1% level.
Table A2: Mean Wages for Husbands and Wives
Husband Wife
Year Only First Activity Total Wages T-test Only First Activity Total Wages T-test
1983 4.412 4.585 122.94 3.609 3.671 34.97
1987 5.035 5.336 125.34 3.788 3.862 38.57
1993 4.718 4.744 48.96 3.991 4.001 19.37
2004 4.874 4.885 39.74 4.155 4.162 17.04
2007 4.972 4.984 35.55 4.336 4.342 13.78
2009 5.064 5.079 31.71 4.479 4.490 14.05
2011 5.146 5.163 33.14 4.620 4.635 16.05
Total 4.932 4.972 4.216 4.236
Notes: The table presents summary statistics for reported log real daily wages by husbands and wives, aged 20-59 using NSS data
and NSS sampling weights. The t-test column shows the results of the test of differences between mean wage from the first activity
and mean wage from all activities. The difference in means for all years and both spouses is statistically different from zero at the
1% level.
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Appendix B Chapter 1: Additional Tables and Figures
Table B1: Construction of Wives’ Birth Cohorts
Age in Survey Year
Cohort Number Birth Cohort 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
1 1924 1928 59 55
2 1929 1933 54 50 58 54
3 1934 1938 49 45 53 49 59 55
4 1939 1943 44 40 48 44 54 50
5 1944 1948 39 35 43 39 49 45 60 56 63 59
6 1949 1953 34 30 38 34 44 40 55 51 58 54 60 56 62 58
7 1954 1958 29 25 33 29 39 35 50 46 53 49 55 51 57 53
8 1959 1963 24 20 28 24 34 30 45 41 48 44 50 46 52 48
9 1964 1968 23 19 29 25 40 36 43 39 45 41 47 43
10 1969 1973 24 20 35 31 38 34 40 36 42 38
11 1974 1978 30 26 33 29 35 31 37 33
12 1979 1983 25 21 28 24 30 26 32 28
13 1984 1988 20 16 23 19 25 21 27 23
14 1989 1993 20 16 22 18
Notes: The table explains construction of wives’ birth cohorts, using NSS data on wives’ age groups in each survey year. The
cohorts used in the paper include wives belonging to the ages between 20 and 59.
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B.1 Additional Results
Table B2: Decomposition Effect of Change in Husbands’ Education Composition on Wives’





Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Total -0.03 -0.091 -0.003 -0.021 0.007 0.043 0.030
Explained -0.0046 -0.039 0.010 -0.035 -0.006 0.023 0.042
1983-1993 Unexplained -0.0301 -0.052 -0.013 0.013 0.013 0.021 -0.012
Total 0.5 0.0246 0.0451 0.0779 0.1811 0.0822 0.0810
Explained -0.0039 -0.0076 -0.0105 0.0181 0.0350 -0.0253 -0.0137
1993-2004 Unexplained 0.4959 0.0322 0.0556 0.0598 0.1461 0.1075 0.0947
Total -0.6061 -0.1353 -0.0642 -0.1169 -0.1467 -0.0461 -0.1065
Explained -0.0027 -0.0245 0.0050 -0.0147 0.0038 0.0516 -0.0239
2004-2011 Unexplained -0.6130 -0.1107 -0.0692 -0.1022 -0.1505 -0.0977 -0.0826
Notes: Decomposition was carried out on the sample of matched husband-wife pairs (both aged 20-59) using NSS sampling weights. I divide
the entire time period between 1983 and 2011 into three oughly equal periods, each spanning approximately ten years.
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Table B3: Decomposition Effect of Change in Husbands’ Education Composition on Wives’





Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Total 0.0165 -0.0048 0.0091 -0.0019 0.0109 -0.0090 0.0147
Explained -0.0035 0.0064 0.0025 -0.0162 -0.0021 -0.0050 0.0109
1983-1993 Unexplained 0.0225 -0.0112 0.0066 0.0143 0.0130 -0.0040 0.0038
Total 0.1766 0.0173 0.0256 0.0452 0.0561 0.0157 0.0134
Explained 0.0044 -0.0004 -0.0024 0.0092 0.0113 -0.0159 0.0025
1993-2004 Unexplained 0.1690 0.0177 0.0280 0.0360 0.0447 0.0317 0.0108
Total -0.1000 -0.0199 0.0105 -0.0483 -0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0408
Explained 0.0014 0.0068 -0.0010 -0.0174 0.0078 0.0042 0.0009
2004-2011 Unexplained -0.1013 -0.0267 0.0115 -0.0309 -0.0087 -0.0048 -0.0417
Notes: Decomposition was carried out on the sample of matched husband-wife pairs (both aged 20-59) using NSS sampling weights. I divide
the entire time period between 1983 and 2011 into three oughly equal periods, each spanning approximately ten years.
80
Table B4: Decomposition Effect of Change in Wives’ Education Composition on Wives’





Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Total -0.038 -0.173 0.043 0.023 0.034 0.033 0.002
Explained -0.009 -0.100 0.034 -0.007 0.014 -0.007 -0.002
1983-1993 Unexplained -0.029 -0.072 0.009 0.030 0.020 0.041 0.004
Total 0.412 0.039 0.063 0.075 0.107 0.060 0.050
Explained -0.017 -0.146 0.014 0.018 0.031 0.027 0.038
1993-2004 Unexplained 0.412 0.185 0.049 0.057 0.076 0.033 0.012
Total -0.659 -0.569 -0.045 -0.041 -0.039 0.020 0.015
Explained -0.006 -0.184 0.029 0.018 0.023 0.069 0.039
2004-2011 Unexplained -0.653 -0.385 -0.074 -0.059 -0.062 -0.049 -0.023
Notes: Decomposition was carried out on the sample of matched husband-wife pairs (both aged 20-59) using NSS sampling weights. I divide
the entire time period between 1983 and 2011 into three oughly equal periods, each spanning approximately ten years.
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Table B5: Decomposition Effect of Change in Wives’ Education Composition on Wives’





Primary Middle Secondary Graduate
& Above
Total 0.035 -0.049 0.013 0.013 0.020 0.004 0.039
Explained 0.030 -0.044 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.028 0.032
1983-1993 Unexplained 0.010 -0.005 0.008 0.013 0.012 -0.024 0.006
Total 0.198 0.032 0.026 0.057 0.047 -0.006 0.047
Explained 0.015 -0.058 -0.002 0.006 0.020 0.009 0.041
1993-2004 Unexplained 0.187 0.090 0.028 0.051 0.026 -0.016 0.006
Total -0.125 -0.163 0.019 -0.017 0.011 0.032 -0.012
Explained -0.004 -0.075 0.016 -0.003 0.003 0.040 0.016
2004-2011 Unexplained -0.125 -0.088 0.003 -0.013 0.008 -0.008 -0.027
Notes: Decomposition was carried out on the sample of matched husband-wife pairs (both aged 20-59) using NSS sampling weights. I divide
the entire time period between 1983 and 2011 into three oughly equal periods, each spanning approximately ten years.
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Table B6: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using 2SLS, With Children As
An Additional Control
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0767*** 0.0852*** 0.103*** 0.128*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.154***
(0.0053) (0.0042) (0.0051) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0067) (0.0066)
Husband’s Wage -0.167*** -0.186*** -0.195*** -0.189*** -0.197*** -0.167*** -0.170***
(0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0038) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0050)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.253*** 0.275*** 0.370*** 0.400*** 0.490*** 0.533*** 0.674***
(0.0169) (0.0134) (0.0182) (0.0173) (0.0215) (0.0275) (0.0287)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.538*** -0.602*** -0.699*** -0.590*** -0.711*** -0.684*** -0.744***
(0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0166) (0.0118) (0.0174) (0.0197) (0.0220)
Observations 94594 104948 96675 108478 101313 87201 87995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages. Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap. Each
year’s regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, state fixed effects, and additional
controls of children aged 0-4, children aged 5-9, children aged 10-14. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance
at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
83
Table B7: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using Maximum Likelihood
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Wife’s Own Wage 0.111*** 0.118*** 0.131*** 0.155*** 0.167*** 0.148*** 0.171***
(0.00730) (0.00562) (0.00646) (0.00663) (0.00716) (0.00728) (0.00695)
Husband’s Wage -0.210*** -0.225*** -0.224*** -0.218*** -0.229*** -0.183*** -0.185***
(0.00524) (0.00542) (0.00581) (0.00466) (0.00615) (0.00560) (0.00581)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.426*** 0.442*** 0.538*** 0.542*** 0.702*** 0.717*** 0.889***
(0.0280) (0.0210) (0.0270) (0.0234) (0.0312) (0.0361) (0.0368)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.801*** -0.842*** -0.921*** -0.766*** -0.962*** -0.889*** -0.964***
(0.0210) (0.0209) (0.0244) (0.0173) (0.0270) (0.0279) (0.0315)
Mean Values:
LFP of Wife 35.0 35.7 31.8 35.1 30.0 27.2 24.3
Wife’s Own Wage 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.6
Husband’s Wage 4.6 5.0 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.2 5.2
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages. Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap.
Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. The top panel’s results for wages are marginal effects at means. * denotes significance at 10
percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
84
Table B8: Wage Coefficients and Elasticities for Alternative Model Specifications
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
LFP Estimates Using 2SLS (Wage Imputation from Workers’ One Paid Activity):
Wife’s Own Wage 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.0990*** 0.114*** 0.125*** 0.117*** 0.134***
(0.0109) (0.0070) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0069)
Husband’s Wage -0.188*** -0.217*** -0.195*** -0.188*** -0.196*** -0.164*** -0.162***
(0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0054)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.325*** 0.403*** 0.354*** 0.355*** 0.451*** 0.480*** 0.586***
(0.0349) (0.0225) (0.0207) (0.0169) (0.0243) (0.0279) (0.0301)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.604*** -0.701*** -0.697*** -0.586*** -0.707*** -0.673*** -0.707***
(0.0187) (0.0151) (0.0179) (0.0129) (0.0187) (0.0202) (0.0236)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 5161.58 9335.247 5068.04 7441.25 6660.19 4624.89 4387.5
LFP Estimates Using 2SLS (Wage Imputation from Workers’ One Paid Activity & Occupation):
Wife’s Own Wage 0.166*** 0.132*** 0.150*** 0.157*** 0.187*** 0.177*** 0.191***
(0.0263) (0.0063) (0.0100) (0.0084) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0106)
Husband’s Wage -0.223*** -0.245*** -0.261*** -0.236*** -0.264*** -0.224*** -0.227***
(0.0093) (0.0062) (0.0081) (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0069) (0.0083)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.536*** 0.427*** 0.537*** 0.492*** 0.674*** 0.724*** 0.834***
(0.0847) (0.0202) (0.0359) (0.0262) (0.0320) (0.0363) (0.0459)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.719*** -0.790*** -0.932*** -0.737*** -0.950*** -0.916*** -0.992***
(0.0297) (0.0199) (0.0288) (0.0191) (0.0264) (0.0280) (0.0362)
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 2710.57 1139.92 753.03 1288.72 736.63 533.9 434.89
Observations 94594 104948 96675 108478 101313 87201 87995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages. Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap.
Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes
significance at 1 percent.
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Table B9: Wage Coefficients and Elasticities for Alternative Model Specifications, Using
Maximum Likelihood
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
LFP Estimates Using MLE (Wage Imputation from Workers’ One Paid Activity):
Wife’s Own Wage 0.144*** 0.168*** 0.123*** 0.139*** 0.155*** 0.135*** 0.151***
(0.0156) (0.00945) (0.00741) (0.00654) (0.00824) (0.00751) (0.00739)
Husband’s Wage -0.241*** -0.266*** -0.222*** -0.216*** -0.225*** -0.179*** -0.175***
(0.00873) (0.00681) (0.00636) (0.00504) (0.00659) (0.00572) (0.00621)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.549*** 0.632*** 0.506*** 0.486*** 0.650*** 0.655*** 0.782***
(0.0600) (0.0361) (0.0309) (0.0231) (0.0355) (0.0373) (0.0391)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.920*** -1.004*** -0.914*** -0.757*** -0.946*** -0.866*** -0.910***
(0.0350) (0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0186) (0.0288) (0.0288) (0.0335)
LFP Estimates Using MLE (Wage Imputation from Workers’ One Paid Activity & Occupation):
Wife’s Own Wage 0.239*** 0.176*** 0.186*** 0.190*** 0.226*** 0.199*** 0.211***
(0.0388) (0.00853) (0.0125) (0.00997) (0.0105) (0.00961) (0.0112)
Husband’s Wage -0.294*** -0.301*** -0.302*** -0.273*** -0.303*** -0.243*** -0.246***
(0.0149) (0.00864) (0.0101) (0.00735) (0.00911) (0.00778) (0.00938)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.914*** 0.664*** 0.766*** 0.668*** 0.954*** 0.969*** 1.100***
(0.150) (0.0326) (0.0525) (0.0356) (0.0457) (0.0475) (0.0590)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -1.121*** -1.136*** -1.245*** -0.958*** -1.279*** -1.186*** -1.282***
(0.0597) (0.0334) (0.0425) (0.0273) (0.0397) (0.0385) (0.0500)
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages. Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap.
Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. The results for wages are marginal effects at means. * denotes significance at 10 percent, **
denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table B10: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using Two-staged Least
Squares (Instrument: Husband-Wife Education Bins)
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0882*** 0.0925*** 0.111*** 0.0955*** 0.0971*** 0.0729*** 0.101***
(0.00499) (0.00383) (0.00418) (0.00484) (0.00531) (0.00567) (0.00619)
Husband’s Wage -0.178*** -0.199*** -0.213*** -0.184*** -0.198*** -0.155*** -0.158***
(0.00415) (0.00438) (0.00502) (0.00431) (0.00523) (0.00543) (0.00570)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.284*** 0.299*** 0.398*** 0.298*** 0.350*** 0.298*** 0.441***
(0.0160) (0.0123) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0193) (0.0233) (0.0271)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.572*** -0.642*** -0.762*** -0.575*** -0.713*** -0.635*** -0.693***
(0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0177) (0.0135) (0.0189) (0.0221) (0.0251)
Cragg Donald Wald F statistic 7144.403 12711.76 5276.63 6644.99 5209.7 3273.3 2782.98
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages, obtained using husband-wife education group as an instrument. Two
hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap. Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age group dummies, caste
dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at 10
percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table B11: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using Two-staged Least
Squares (Instrument: Each Spouse’s Wage Deciles and Education)
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Wife’s Own Wage 0.102*** 0.0876*** 0.0973*** 0.118*** 0.109*** 0.0948*** 0.113***
(0.00854) (0.00495) (0.00623) (0.00738) (0.00906) (0.00720) (0.00835)
Husband’s Wage -0.158*** -0.167*** -0.154*** -0.155*** -0.156*** -0.118*** -0.112***
(0.00370) (0.00338) (0.00372) (0.00348) (0.00427) (0.00379) (0.00355)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.330*** 0.283*** 0.348*** 0.367*** 0.392*** 0.388*** 0.493***
(0.0273) (0.0158) (0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0329) (0.0296) (0.0365)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.509*** -0.539*** -0.551*** -0.485*** -0.561*** -0.481*** -0.492***
(0.0119) (0.0109) (0.0131) (0.0107) (0.0157) (0.0154) (0.0157)
Cragg Donald Wald F statistic 21856.98 27662.23 19016.55 21119.91 22859.28 18668.74 17713.64
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages, obtained using husband’s and wife’s education and wage decile as
instruments. Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap. Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age group
dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes
significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table B12: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, Using Two-staged Least
Squares (Instrument: Each Spouse’s Mean State Wage and Education)
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0868*** 0.0967*** 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.142*** 0.154***
(0.00528) (0.00423) (0.00552) (0.00616) (0.00589) (0.00746) (0.00700)
Husband’s Wage -0.176*** -0.202*** -0.209*** -0.177*** -0.161*** -0.148*** -0.135***
(0.00410) (0.00425) (0.00513) (0.00493) (0.00508) (0.00560) (0.00582)
Elasticity at Mean:
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.279*** 0.312*** 0.400*** 0.435*** 0.458*** 0.583*** 0.675***
(0.0171) (0.0136) (0.0198) (0.0192) (0.0210) (0.0305) (0.0303)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.567*** -0.652*** -0.747*** -0.552*** -0.578*** -0.607*** -0.589***
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.0184) (0.0154) (0.0180) (0.0229) (0.0252)
Cragg Donald Wald F statistic 6580.55 11164.82 4586.8 6720.4 6100.44 3996.93 3694.74
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages, obtained using husband’s and wife’s education and mean wage at the state
level as instruments. Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap. Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age
group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, and region dummy. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis. * denotes significance at
10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table B13: Estimation of Labor Force Participation Elasticities, by Wives’ Education
Groups
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Education: Not Literate
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.116*** 0.105*** 0.153*** 0.0918*** 0.116*** 0.00815 0.141**
(0.0170) (0.0118) (0.0225) (0.0235) (0.0312) (0.0389) (0.0531)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.409*** -0.442*** -0.428*** -0.344*** -0.468*** -0.434*** -0.379***
(0.0111) (0.0110) (0.0148) (0.0124) (0.0150) (0.0190) (0.0213)
Observations 63579 64159 51715 45669 42369 28227 26342
Education: Literate Below Primary
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.474*** 0.197** 0.219 0.161** 0.0679 0.0200 0.0900
(0.1033) (0.0700) (0.1121) (0.0500) (0.0871) (0.0905) (0.1097)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.647*** -0.509*** -0.542*** -0.437*** -0.488*** -0.374*** -0.465***
(0.0402) (0.0418) (0.0384) (0.0277) (0.0315) (0.0448) (0.0410)
Observations 7958 9751 9400 11448 10260 8046 8616
Education: Primary
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.477** 0.221* 0.452*** 0.159* 0.215*** 0.0164 0.175
(0.1504) (0.0918) (0.1222) (0.0685) (0.0628) (0.0855) (0.1013)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.768*** -0.614*** -0.556*** -0.492*** -0.573*** -0.451*** -0.470***
(0.0406) (0.0370) (0.0459) (0.0263) (0.0295) (0.0338) (0.0372)
Observations 9859 11938 10901 14534 13379 11871 11286
Education: Middle
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 1.137*** 0.273* 0.581*** 0.318*** 0.199 0.160* 0.288**
(0.3417) (0.1072) (0.1616) (0.0675) (0.1253) (0.0774) (0.1021)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.859*** -0.663*** -0.555*** -0.538*** -0.696*** -0.529*** -0.520***
(0.0793) (0.0710) (0.0561) (0.0302) (0.0363) (0.0317) (0.0384)
Observations 6509 8156 10152 15669 14362 14311 14577
Education: Secondary
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.152* 0.0996** 0.133** 0.321*** 0.323*** 0.239*** 0.315***
(0.0721) (0.0382) (0.0417) (0.0451) (0.0703) (0.0497) (0.0493)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.165* -0.229*** -0.115** -0.453*** -0.629*** -0.432*** -0.379***
(0.0652) (0.0529) (0.0364) (0.0346) (0.0441) (0.0310) (0.0333)
Observations 4904 7729 10269 14461 14366 17453 18831
Education: Graduate & Above
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.126 0.111* 0.0471 0.0937*** 0.0413 0.0271 0.120***
(0.0905) (0.0439) (0.0280) (0.0223) (0.0278) (0.0191) (0.0272)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.226* -0.233*** -0.0345 -0.107** -0.0264 -0.0136 -0.0972**
(0.0978) (0.0693) (0.0342) (0.0335) (0.0447) (0.0377) (0.0377)
Observations 1785 3215 4238 6697 6577 7293 8343
Notes: Two hundred replications were carried out during the bootstrap. Each year’s regression includes wife and husband age
group dummies, caste dummy, religion dummy, region dummy, and state fixed effects. Each year’s wage imputation was carried
out separately for each sex and education group, estimating wages on a vector of educational categories × age categories and the
above controls. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
* denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table B14: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation Elasticities, by Wives’ Birth
Cohorts
Dependent Variable: LFPw 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Birth Cohort 1949-53
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.435*** 0.375*** 0.402***
(0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0452)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.633*** -0.670*** -0.651***
(0.0311) (0.0329) (0.0335)
Observations 16,367 16,815 12,003
Birth Cohort 1954-58
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.356*** 0.404*** 0.566*** 0.347*** 0.347***
(0.0324) (0.0300) (0.0508) (0.0474) (0.0553)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.673*** -0.670*** -0.795*** -0.497*** -0.471***
(0.0305) (0.0311) (0.0409) (0.0331) (0.0419)
Observations 19,919 17,878 15,392 10,207 8,441
Birth Cohort 1959-63
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.271*** 0.347*** 0.533*** 0.458*** 0.471*** 0.372*** 0.521***
(0.0620) (0.0372) (0.0507) (0.0381) (0.0505) (0.0573) (0.0762)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.845*** -0.714*** -0.785*** -0.566*** -0.661*** -0.510*** -0.522***
(0.0402) (0.0309) (0.0461) (0.0285) (0.0338) (0.0438) (0.0460)
Observations 18724 23824 17390 13002 13815 9071 8080
Birth Cohort 1964-68
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.200*** 0.414*** 0.522*** 0.617*** 0.397*** 0.490***
(0.0462) (0.0524) (0.0381) (0.0557) (0.0630) (0.0627)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.744*** -0.797*** -0.677*** -0.734*** -0.539*** -0.551***
(0.0452) (0.0571) (0.0271) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0478)
Observations 16,599 19,560 18,985 14,147 11,017 10,116
Birth Cohort 1969-73
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.225*** 0.635*** 0.711*** 0.515*** 0.636***
(0.0820) (0.0523) (0.0548) (0.0552) (0.0508)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.832*** -0.759*** -0.896*** -0.592*** -0.654***
(0.109) (0.0331) (0.0386) (0.0359) (0.0430)
Observations 16,725 19,092 16,094 15,894 15,671
Birth Cohort 1974-78
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.568*** 0.746*** 0.636*** 0.684***
(0.0535) (0.0646) (0.0588) (0.0646)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -0.770*** -0.917*** -0.738*** -0.638***
(0.0425) (0.0502) (0.0439) (0.0496)
Observations 21,636 16,472 15,453 14,146
Birth Cohort 1979-83
Wife’s Own-Wage Elasticity 0.805*** 0.703*** 0.691*** 0.772***
(0.0864) (0.0756) (0.0690) (0.0658)
Husband’s Wage Elasticity -1.047*** -0.966*** -0.705*** -0.740***
(0.0699) (0.0670) (0.0551) (0.0524)
Observations 17,422 19,117 17,081 17,904
Notes: Wages refer to fitted values of log real daily imputed wages. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
Each column represents a separate bootstrapped regression for each birth cohort and year, also controlling for caste,
religion, region, and state fixed effects. Each year’s wage imputation was carried out separately for each spouse and
wife’s birth cohort, estimating wages on the above controls and a vector of educational categories × age categories. *
denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Table B15: Estimation of Wives’ Labor Force Participation, using Grouped Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: LFPw OLS Elasticity OLS Elasticity OLS Elasticity
Wife’s Own Wage 0.0861*** 0.275*** 0.0634** 0.203** 0.0742** 0.238**
(0.0211) (0.0661) (0.0311) (0.0983) (0.0291) (0.0924)
Husband’s Wage -0.0732*** -0.234*** -0.106* -0.339* -0.145*** -0.465***
(0.0199) (0.0628) (0.0575) (0.183) (0.0430) (0.136)
Caste: Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribe 0.250*** 0.241*** 0.158*
(0.0708) (0.0789) (0.0858)
Religion: Hindu -0.180*** -0.172** 0.0096
(0.0661) (0.0697) (0.0861)
Rural 0.198*** 0.156* 0.128
(0.0737) (0.0832) (0.0806)
Constant 0.247 0.438 3.053
(0.197) (0.294) (2.473)
R-squared 0.295 0.344 0.522
State Dummies No No No No Yes Yes
Age and Education FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 646 646 646 646 646 646
Notes: These are OLS Estimates of wives’ LFP, using grouped data. I specify three education groups (no education, low education, and high
education) and four age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-59) for each spouse. Group averages are calculated for wives’ education-husbands’
education-wives’ age group-husbands’ age group, using NSS sampling weights. Cells with size less than 5 are dropped in each year. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. LFP Elasticities are calculated at the mean. * denotes significance at 10 percent, ** denotes significance
at 5 percent, *** denotes significance at 1 percent.
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Notes: Data Source: The World Bank, these estimates are a percentage of the female population,
aged 15 and above.
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Appendix C Chapter 2: Additional Tables and Figures
Table C1: Summary Statistics of Matched Husband-Wife Pairs
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011 Total
Rural 76.1 76.9 75.1 73.8 73.0 72.1 70.7 72.7
Caste: Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribe 26.6 27.0 27.6 28.1 28.5 28.8 27.6 28.1
Religion: Hindu 84.4 83.8 84.8 83.4 83.5 83.5 83.0 83.5
Mean Household Size 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.7 5.5 5.3 5.2 5.5
Mean Number of Children in the HH (aged 0-4) 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6
Mean Number of Children in the HH (aged 5-9) 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Mean Number of Children in the HH (aged 10-14) 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Husband Characteristics:
Mean Age 38.1 38.0 38.2 38.8 39.1 39.2 39.4 39.0
Usually Employed 39.78 16.38 42.73 41.48 44.49 46.7 45.4 41.08
Education:
Illiterate 44.7 42.1 37.7 29.7 26.4 24.1 23.1 30.5
Literate Below Primary 14.2 14.7 14.4 12.1 10.8 10.4 11.2 12.1
Primary 15.3 15.4 13.6 14.5 15.5 14.7 13.3 14.5
Middle 11.8 11.6 13.5 16.9 18.4 18.1 18.1 16.2
Secondary 10.1 11.7 14.4 16.8 18.7 21.4 21.9 17.4
Graduate & Above 4.0 4.6 6.5 10.2 10.2 11.2 12.4 9.2
Wife Characteristics:
Mean Age 32.6 32.7 33.1 34.1 34.5 34.6 34.8 34.3
Usually employed 12.14 9.52 12.75 12.91 12.56 11.86 10.27 11.74
Education:
Illiterate 72.8 69.8 63.8 51.7 46.3 42.7 40.0 52.3
Literate Below Primary 7.2 8.2 9.0 9.4 9.7 10.1 10.4 9.4
Primary 9.2 9.5 9.6 11.6 13.2 13.1 12.4 11.6
Middle 5.6 5.8 8.0 11.9 13.4 13.3 13.7 11.0
Secondary 3.9 4.9 7.1 10.3 12.3 14.7 16.3 11.0
Graduate & Above 1.4 1.8 2.6 5.2 5.2 6.3 7.3 4.8
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995 681,204
Notes: Summary statistics using NSS data and NSS sampling weights. Matched husband-wife pairs are aged 20-59. SC-ST refers to scheduled
caste-scheduled tribe, the economically backward sections of the society. HH refers to household.
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C.1 Additional Results
Table C2: Heckman Two-Step Estimates of Wives’ Log Wages, with Husbands’ Wages in Z
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Inverse mills ratio 0.695*** 0.956*** 0.690*** 0.571*** 0.481*** 0.352*** 0.380***
(0.0245) (0.0509) (0.0320) (0.0223) (0.0164) (0.0255) (0.0306)
Age 0.0545*** 0.0993*** 0.0622*** 0.0705*** 0.0400*** 0.0332*** 0.0327***
(0.00687) (0.0167) (0.00700) (0.00667) (0.00532) (0.00679) (0.00830)
Ageˆ2 -0.000717*** -0.00126*** -0.000835*** -0.000896*** -0.000527*** -0.000425*** -0.000417***
(0.000102) (0.000247) (0.000101) (9.22e-05) (7.30e-05) (9.24e-05) (0.000111)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary -0.0686 0.0378 -0.104 0.00771 0.0244 -0.00204 -0.0557
(0.0758) (0.184) (0.0717) (0.0507) (0.0386) (0.0504) (0.0600)
Primary -0.257*** -0.375** -0.210*** -0.0600 -0.0959** -0.00746 -0.0209
(0.0864) (0.186) (0.0754) (0.0524) (0.0401) (0.0515) (0.0580)
Middle -0.439*** -0.598*** -0.349*** -0.194*** -0.270*** -0.244*** -0.156**
(0.140) (0.199) (0.104) (0.0716) (0.0548) (0.0670) (0.0659)
Secondary 1.237*** 1.169*** 0.512*** -0.149** -0.322*** -0.278*** -0.331***
(0.0830) (0.106) (0.0812) (0.0726) (0.0705) (0.0773) (0.0720)
Graduate & Above 1.776*** 2.063*** 1.262*** 1.007*** 0.985*** 1.063*** 0.744***
(0.0969) (0.0981) (0.0837) (0.0619) (0.0601) (0.0614) (0.0597)
Rural 0.0698*** 0.0329 0.112*** 0.0152 0.0233 -0.00742 0.00111
(0.0219) (0.0389) (0.0231) (0.0187) (0.0175) (0.0187) (0.0205)
Caste: SCST 0.189*** 0.439*** 0.216*** 0.151*** 0.0809*** 0.0424*** 0.119***
(0.0159) (0.0384) (0.0155) (0.0141) (0.0119) (0.0154) (0.0164)
Religion: Hindu 0.0174 -0.000652 -0.0316 -0.00532 0.0518*** -0.0369 -0.0967***
(0.0223) (0.0431) (0.0231) (0.0204) (0.0188) (0.0236) (0.0245)
Constant 1.739*** 0.601** 1.925*** 2.039*** 2.903*** 3.349*** 3.379***
(0.126) (0.302) (0.144) (0.132) (0.107) (0.142) (0.176)
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: The regressions are the basis for the Heckman two-step estimates of wives’ predicted wages in table 2.3 Panel A. The first-stage
employment probit uses husbands’ actual wages, state indicators, and household demographics as identifying variables. The log wage regressions
control for wives’ age quadratic interacted with her education dummies as well as region, caste, and religion. They are carried out separately
for each year, and use the sample of all wives from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Five hundred replications
are carried out in the bootstrap. The regressions include education-age interactions (not shown). SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled
Tribes of India. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C3: Heckman Two-Step Estimates of Wives’ Log Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Inverse Mills Ratio 0.315*** 0.245*** 0.201*** 0.202*** 0.170*** -0.0801*** -0.0795***
(0.0218) (0.0247) (0.0233) (0.0206) (0.0170) (0.0235) (0.0277)
Age 0.0333*** 0.0300*** 0.0326*** 0.0420*** 0.0179*** 0.00478 -0.00442
(0.00541) (0.00672) (0.00548) (0.00599) (0.00472) (0.00676) (0.00718)
Ageˆ2 -0.000473*** -0.000409*** -0.000442*** -0.000558*** -0.000272*** -4.65e-05 7.71e-05
(8.01e-05) (9.92e-05) (7.88e-05) (8.34e-05) (6.43e-05) (9.22e-05) (9.66e-05)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary -0.0187 -0.147* -0.0214 -0.0334 -0.0162 -0.0235 -0.0265
(0.0651) (0.0867) (0.0563) (0.0441) (0.0336) (0.0461) (0.0527)
Primary -0.147** -0.217** -0.0859 -0.0636 -0.0599* 0.0128 0.00248
(0.0741) (0.0963) (0.0627) (0.0432) (0.0360) (0.0461) (0.0496)
Middle -0.278** -0.299** -0.111 -0.123** -0.190*** -0.0911 -0.0502
(0.126) (0.117) (0.112) (0.0591) (0.0513) (0.0574) (0.0533)
Secondary 1.377*** 1.213*** 0.828*** 0.0243 -0.117* -0.0194 -0.0596
(0.0792) (0.0736) (0.0664) (0.0621) (0.0622) (0.0680) (0.0624)
Graduate & Above 1.864*** 1.935*** 1.378*** 1.094*** 1.030*** 1.012*** 0.814***
(0.0779) (0.0639) (0.0713) (0.0506) (0.0485) (0.0529) (0.0529)
Rural -0.138*** -0.278*** -0.119*** -0.148*** -0.130*** -0.109*** -0.110***
(0.0185) (0.0191) (0.0163) (0.0144) (0.0155) (0.0168) (0.0165)
Caste: SCST 0.169*** 0.189*** 0.147*** 0.135*** 0.0671*** -0.000965 0.0668***
(0.0141) (0.0157) (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0109) (0.0139) (0.0147)
Religion: Hindu -0.0292 0.0242 -0.0580*** -0.0941*** -0.0263 -0.147*** -0.154***
(0.0192) (0.0213) (0.0203) (0.0187) (0.0169) (0.0200) (0.0199)
Constant 2.600*** 2.886*** 3.111*** 3.082*** 3.781*** 4.553*** 4.770***
(0.104) (0.128) (0.113) (0.121) (0.101) (0.139) (0.158)
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: The regressions are the basis for the Heckman two-step estimates of wives’ predicted wages in table 2.3 panel B. The first-stage
employment probit uses state indicators and household demographics as identifying variables. The log wage regressions control for wives’ age
quadratic interacted with her education dummies as well as region, caste, and religion. They are carried out separately for each year, and
use the sample of all wives from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Five hundred replications are carried out in
the bootstrap. The regressions include education-age interactions (not shown). SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribes of India.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
96
Table C4: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Wives’ Log Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Age 0.0116** 0.0165*** 0.0208*** 0.0255*** 0.00432 0.0111* 0.00180
(0.00538) (0.00623) (0.00559) (0.00542) (0.00456) (0.00659) (0.00704)
Ageˆ2 -0.000150* -0.000199** -0.000263*** -0.000320*** -7.93e-05 -0.000135 -1.01e-05
(7.78e-05) (9.01e-05) (7.99e-05) (7.51e-05) (6.18e-05) (9.00e-05) (9.50e-05)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary 0.0323 -0.0850 0.0301 -0.0144 -0.0111 -0.0195 -0.0300
(0.0571) (0.0698) (0.0540) (0.0485) (0.0406) (0.0587) (0.0667)
Primary -0.0511 -0.103 -0.0168 -0.0111 -0.0367 0.00480 -0.00726
(0.0641) (0.0752) (0.0626) (0.0503) (0.0380) (0.0551) (0.0628)
Middle -0.0353 -0.112 0.000741 -0.0467 -0.124*** -0.116* -0.0710
(0.0892) (0.0871) (0.0780) (0.0537) (0.0453) (0.0596) (0.0620)
Secondary 1.520*** 1.359*** 0.963*** 0.159*** -0.00407 -0.0705 -0.101*
(0.0604) (0.0569) (0.0478) (0.0472) (0.0431) (0.0528) (0.0534)
Graduate & Above 1.880*** 1.963*** 1.408*** 1.132*** 1.045*** 1.007*** 0.807***
(0.0737) (0.0593) (0.0528) (0.0421) (0.0383) (0.0474) (0.0494)
Rural -0.206*** -0.290*** -0.156*** -0.170*** -0.176*** -0.0973*** -0.100***
(0.0147) (0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0149) (0.0154)
Caste: SCST 0.0800*** 0.132*** 0.0921*** 0.0827*** 0.0256** 0.0158 0.0848***
(0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0125) (0.0117) (0.0102) (0.0142) (0.0150)
Religion: Hindu -0.0637*** -0.00220 -0.0851*** -0.138*** -0.0567*** -0.134*** -0.145***
(0.0173) (0.0194) (0.0176) (0.0160) (0.0144) (0.0182) (0.0184)
Constant 3.522*** 3.535*** 3.659*** 3.723*** 4.326*** 4.301*** 4.518***
(0.0918) (0.107) (0.0979) (0.0987) (0.0845) (0.123) (0.134)
Observations 9,846 8,094 9,840 10,637 10,891 8,061 7,627
R-squared 0.568 0.680 0.563 0.582 0.567 0.538 0.514
Notes: The regressions are the basis for the OLS estimates of wives’ predicted wages in table 2.3 panel A and B. The regressions control
for demographics, are carried out for each year, and use the sample of usually employed wives from the NSS data. The regressions include
education-age interactions (not shown). SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribes of India. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C5: Heckman Two-Step Estimates of Husbands’ Log Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0749*** -0.357*** -0.103*** -0.222*** -0.253*** -0.330*** -0.486***
(0.0195) (0.0225) (0.0215) (0.0242) (0.0204) (0.0260) (0.0271)
Age 0.0385*** 0.0427*** 0.0407*** 0.0384*** 0.0166*** 0.0182*** 0.0187***
(0.00333) (0.00476) (0.00337) (0.00295) (0.00239) (0.00317) (0.00299)
Ageˆ2 -0.000442*** -0.000378*** -0.000461*** -0.000373*** -0.000154*** -0.000109*** -9.89e-05***
(4.44e-05) (6.25e-05) (4.47e-05) (3.88e-05) (3.03e-05) (4.10e-05) (3.82e-05)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary 0.0829*** 0.169*** 0.0633*** 0.0823*** -4.39e-05 0.0129 -0.0102
(0.0232) (0.0416) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0266) (0.0278)
Primary 0.214*** 0.285*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.0400** 0.0201 0.00430
(0.0239) (0.0375) (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0176) (0.0228) (0.0254)
Middle 0.322*** 0.487*** 0.194*** 0.179*** 0.0983*** 0.0887*** 0.108***
(0.0272) (0.0385) (0.0233) (0.0221) (0.0185) (0.0241) (0.0247)
Secondary 0.824*** 0.879*** 0.522*** 0.346*** 0.272*** 0.328*** 0.317***
(0.0249) (0.0342) (0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0208) (0.0252) (0.0255)
Graduate & Above 1.168*** 1.220*** 0.939*** 0.903*** 0.830*** 0.957*** 0.818***
(0.0285) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0247) (0.0233) (0.0256) (0.0254)
Rural -0.506*** 0.151*** -0.305*** -0.167*** -0.283*** -0.119*** -0.0802***
(0.00981) (0.0282) (0.00910) (0.00767) (0.00695) (0.00779) (0.00810)
Caste: SCST -0.0908*** -0.0849*** -0.0643*** -0.0474*** -0.0897*** -0.101*** -0.103***
(0.00836) (0.0125) (0.00947) (0.00809) (0.00721) (0.00885) (0.00898)
Religion: Hindu -0.109*** -0.0541*** -0.0783*** -0.198*** -0.161*** -0.146*** -0.168***
(0.00869) (0.0114) (0.00892) (0.00771) (0.00679) (0.00731) (0.00740)
Constant 3.947*** 4.026*** 3.959*** 4.160*** 4.807*** 4.789*** 4.946***
(0.0689) (0.0990) (0.0698) (0.0658) (0.0506) (0.0679) (0.0663)
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: The regressions are the basis for the Heckman two-step estimates of husbands’ predicted wages in table 2.3 panel C. The first-stage
employment probit uses state indicators and household demographics as identifying variables. The log wage regressions control for husbands’
age quadratic interacted with his education dummies as well as region, caste, and religion. They are carried out separately for each year, and
use the sample of all husbands from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Five hundred replications are carried out
in the bootstrap. The regressions include education-age interactions (not shown). SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribes of India.
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C6: Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of Husbands’ Log Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Age 0.0426*** 0.0639*** 0.0458*** 0.0458*** 0.0221*** 0.0241*** 0.0255***
(0.00297) (0.00438) (0.00310) (0.00264) (0.00230) (0.00285) (0.00278)
Ageˆ2 -0.000504*** -0.000668*** -0.000537*** -0.000496*** -0.000256*** -0.000224*** -0.000256***
(3.82e-05) (5.65e-05) (3.96e-05) (3.36e-05) (2.88e-05) (3.60e-05) (3.52e-05)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary 0.0774*** 0.187*** 0.0606** 0.0618** -0.00691 0.0131 -0.0195
(0.0239) (0.0414) (0.0257) (0.0249) (0.0216) (0.0307) (0.0304)
Primary 0.204*** 0.308*** 0.113*** 0.0995*** 0.0176 0.00387 -0.0377
(0.0226) (0.0369) (0.0257) (0.0232) (0.0195) (0.0267) (0.0275)
Middle 0.305*** 0.479*** 0.164*** 0.125*** 0.0424** 0.0306 -0.00143
(0.0239) (0.0374) (0.0253) (0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0249) (0.0250)
Secondary 0.813*** 0.907*** 0.484*** 0.259*** 0.159*** 0.192*** 0.112***
(0.0232) (0.0332) (0.0228) (0.0211) (0.0185) (0.0238) (0.0236)
Graduate & Above 1.171*** 1.304*** 0.920*** 0.856*** 0.767*** 0.911*** 0.715***
(0.0304) (0.0374) (0.0274) (0.0229) (0.0202) (0.0251) (0.0246)
Rural -0.528*** -0.239*** -0.331*** -0.212*** -0.322*** -0.174*** -0.152***
(0.00714) (0.0130) (0.00713) (0.00594) (0.00569) (0.00634) (0.00617)
Caste: SCST -0.0735*** -0.0411*** -0.0390*** 0.00709 -0.0350*** -0.0241*** 0.00897
(0.00729) (0.0117) (0.00741) (0.00605) (0.00539) (0.00652) (0.00633)
Religion: Hindu -0.104*** -0.0203* -0.0699*** -0.181*** -0.142*** -0.131*** -0.144***
(0.00802) (0.0112) (0.00839) (0.00681) (0.00624) (0.00726) (0.00702)
Constant 3.823*** 3.307*** 3.798*** 3.863*** 4.554*** 4.466*** 4.527***
(0.0577) (0.0869) (0.0610) (0.0535) (0.0469) (0.0593) (0.0580)
Observations 37,836 21,640 40,051 42,377 44,206 38,366 38,735
R-squared 0.576 0.457 0.444 0.506 0.544 0.463 0.442
Notes: The regressions are the basis for the OLS estimates of husbands’ predicted wages in table 2.3 panel C. The regressions control for
demographics, are carried out for each year, and use the sample of usually employed husbands from the NSS data. The regressions include
education-age interactions (not shown). ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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Table C7: Marginal Effects from Wives’ Employment Probit with Husbands Wages in Z
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Age 0.0874*** 0.136*** 0.0903*** 0.0975*** 0.0900*** 0.0818*** 0.0993***
(0.00887) (0.0136) (0.00838) (0.00845) (0.00776) (0.00903) (0.00929)
Ageˆ2 -0.00113*** -0.00184*** -0.00122*** -0.00125*** -0.00112*** -0.00105*** -0.00131***
(0.000129) (0.000197) (0.000120) (0.000118) (0.000107) (0.000124) (0.000127)
Husbands’ Actual Wages -0.572*** -0.500*** -0.385*** -0.572*** -0.544*** -0.433*** -0.353***
(0.0145) (0.0183) (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0156) (0.0150) (0.0150)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary -0.0879 -0.215* -0.253*** -0.117* -0.00729 -0.000508 -0.0431
(0.0784) (0.112) (0.0695) (0.0641) (0.0598) (0.0737) (0.0772)
Primary -0.329*** -0.383*** -0.411*** -0.379*** -0.209*** -0.164** -0.160**
(0.0764) (0.108) (0.0713) (0.0641) (0.0555) (0.0659) (0.0717)
Middle -0.788*** -0.821*** -0.738*** -0.614*** -0.615*** -0.561*** -0.435***
(0.0991) (0.122) (0.0824) (0.0663) (0.0614) (0.0680) (0.0710)
Secondary 0.228*** 0.0486 -0.518*** -0.775*** -0.813*** -0.805*** -0.659***
(0.0747) (0.0800) (0.0609) (0.0620) (0.0608) (0.0643) (0.0621)
Graduate & Above 1.072*** 0.896*** 0.385*** 0.204*** 0.452*** 0.353*** 0.0704
(0.107) (0.0953) (0.0750) (0.0655) (0.0645) (0.0665) (0.0663)
Rural 0.278*** 0.0942*** 0.418*** 0.265*** 0.421*** 0.265*** 0.187***
(0.0220) (0.0349) (0.0193) (0.0183) (0.0198) (0.0192) (0.0192)
Caste: SCST 0.343*** 0.457*** 0.368*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.250*** 0.245***
(0.0189) (0.0311) (0.0184) (0.0176) (0.0171) (0.0193) (0.0197)
Religion: Hindu 0.146*** 0.0364 0.178*** 0.244*** 0.219*** 0.211*** 0.197***
(0.0245) (0.0332) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0256) (0.0260)
Size of Household -0.0427*** -0.0172** -0.0325*** -0.0314*** -0.0454*** -0.0261*** -0.00928
(0.00557) (0.00791) (0.00538) (0.00523) (0.00526) (0.00576) (0.00577)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 0-4) -0.0283** -0.0641*** -0.0440*** -0.0562*** -0.0135 -0.0511*** -0.0529***
(0.0123) (0.0192) (0.0124) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0153) (0.0163)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 5-9) 0.0510*** -0.0124 0.0285*** 0.0601*** 0.0877*** 0.0556*** 0.0517***
(0.0117) (0.0171) (0.0106) (0.0112) (0.0115) (0.0128) (0.0133)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 10-14) 0.0387*** -0.0100 0.0174 0.0455*** 0.104*** 0.0829*** 0.0434***
(0.0132) (0.0188) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0135)
Constant -0.652*** -1.219*** -1.250*** -0.568*** -0.557*** -0.678*** -1.510***
(0.180) (0.252) (0.176) (0.180) (0.180) (0.189) (0.193)
Observations 37,836 21,640 40,051 42,377 44,206 38,366 38,735
Notes: The entries are marginal effects (at means) from first-stage regressions of Heckman two-step estimates of wives’ predicted wages in
table 2.3 panel A. The first-stage employment probit uses husbands’ actual wages, state indicators, and household demographics as identifying
variables. In addition to the above, the regressions control for state indicators and quadratic age-education interaction (not shown). They
are carried out separately for each year, and use the sample of all wives from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses.
One hundred replications are carried out in the bootstrap. SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribes of India. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗p < 0.1
100
Table C8: Marginal Effects from Wives’ Employment Probit
1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age 0.0632*** 0.0598*** 0.0711*** 0.0750*** 0.0766*** 0.0745*** 0.0813***
(0.00577) (0.00670) (0.00620) (0.00572) (0.00582) (0.00543) (0.00764)
Ageˆ2 -0.000911*** -0.000904*** -0.00105*** -0.00107*** -0.00109*** -0.00106*** -0.00114***
(8.12e-05) (9.39e-05) (8.75e-05) (7.74e-05) (7.98e-05) (7.61e-05) (0.000101)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary -0.252*** -0.367*** -0.344*** -0.182*** -0.106** -0.00579 -0.0830
(0.0447) (0.0490) (0.0485) (0.0481) (0.0440) (0.0508) (0.0591)
Primary -0.489*** -0.669*** -0.500*** -0.415*** -0.273*** -0.231*** -0.231***
(0.0576) (0.0588) (0.0442) (0.0441) (0.0505) (0.0530) (0.0549)
Middle -0.872*** -0.906*** -0.819*** -0.611*** -0.616*** -0.531*** -0.494***
(0.0691) (0.0744) (0.0625) (0.0486) (0.0414) (0.0600) (0.0514)
Secondary -0.233*** -0.458*** -0.659*** -0.745*** -0.797*** -0.763*** -0.603***
(0.0549) (0.0440) (0.0483) (0.0432) (0.0437) (0.0503) (0.0482)
Graduate & Above 0.439*** 0.175*** 0.0762 -0.0884* 0.0449 0.0114 -0.0194
(0.0900) (0.0628) (0.0528) (0.0522) (0.0533) (0.0551) (0.0457)
Rural 0.242*** 0.0277* 0.242*** 0.154*** 0.343*** 0.162*** 0.109***
(0.0172) (0.0167) (0.0155) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0163) (0.0147)
Caste: SCST 0.525*** 0.482*** 0.490*** 0.425*** 0.440*** 0.366*** 0.339***
(0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0134) (0.0143) (0.0110) (0.0162) (0.0147)
Religion: Hindu 0.0812*** 0.0931*** 0.133*** 0.197*** 0.161*** 0.177*** 0.158***
(0.0201) (0.0193) (0.0185) (0.0170) (0.0180) (0.0195) (0.0197)
Size of Household -0.0781*** -0.0791*** -0.0796*** -0.0658*** -0.0672*** -0.0483*** -0.0407***
(0.00427) (0.00433) (0.00351) (0.00345) (0.00414) (0.00416) (0.00390)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 0-4) 0.0133 0.0149 0.0156* -0.00448 0.0143 -0.00584 -0.00691
(0.00881) (0.0108) (0.00855) (0.00932) (0.00955) (0.0104) (0.0113)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 5-9) 0.0589*** 0.0667*** 0.0532*** 0.0764*** 0.0740*** 0.0503*** 0.0603***
(0.00917) (0.00885) (0.00805) (0.00888) (0.00803) (0.00916) (0.00873)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 10-14) 0.0492*** 0.0411*** 0.0493*** 0.0703*** 0.0990*** 0.0922*** 0.0592***
(0.00907) (0.0108) (0.00773) (0.00803) (0.00927) (0.0102) (0.00917)
Constant -3.126*** -2.709*** -2.797*** -3.033*** -3.068*** -2.794*** -2.996***
(0.118) (0.130) (0.141) (0.113) (0.119) (0.111) (0.145)
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: The entries are marginal effects (at means) from first-stage regressions of Heckman two-step estimates of wives’ predicted wages in
table 2.3 panel B. The first-stage employment probit uses state indicators and household demographics as identifying variables. In addition to
the above, the regressions control for state indicators and quadratic age-education interaction (not shown). They are carried out separately
for each year, and use the sample of all wives from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. One hundred replications are
carried out in the bootstrap. SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribes of India. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
101
Table C9: Marginal Effects from Husbands’ Employment Probit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Variables 1983 1987 1993 2004 2007 2009 2011
Age 0.0553*** 0.0738*** 0.0518*** 0.0216*** 0.0120*** 0.00656 0.00125
(0.00427) (0.00562) (0.00421) (0.00401) (0.00399) (0.00446) (0.00445)
Ageˆ2 -0.000891*** -0.000994*** -0.000814*** -0.000480*** -0.000373*** -0.000283*** -0.000252***
(5.40e-05) (7.13e-05) (5.29e-05) (5.01e-05) (4.92e-05) (5.55e-05) (5.52e-05)
Reference Category: Illiterate
Literate Below Primary -0.160*** 0.0222 -0.0872*** -0.194*** -0.0667* -0.0393 -0.0713
(0.0318) (0.0449) (0.0329) (0.0350) (0.0364) (0.0457) (0.0462)
Primary -0.191*** 0.0290 -0.311*** -0.265*** -0.171*** -0.148*** -0.202***
(0.0295) (0.0408) (0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0396) (0.0415)
Middle -0.310*** -0.0831* -0.443*** -0.417*** -0.385*** -0.344*** -0.398***
(0.0316) (0.0425) (0.0316) (0.0303) (0.0306) (0.0365) (0.0376)
Secondary -0.125*** 0.118*** -0.512*** -0.614*** -0.712*** -0.683*** -0.697***
(0.0327) (0.0389) (0.0294) (0.0296) (0.0302) (0.0346) (0.0355)
Graduate & Above 0.301*** 0.442*** -0.176*** -0.328*** -0.411*** -0.263*** -0.366***
(0.0481) (0.0480) (0.0377) (0.0342) (0.0349) (0.0391) (0.0391)
Rural -0.474*** -1.748*** -0.384*** -0.278*** -0.209*** -0.244*** -0.211***
(0.0102) (0.0124) (0.00966) (0.00886) (0.00948) (0.00953) (0.00946)
Caste: SCST 0.429*** 0.257*** 0.454*** 0.424*** 0.411*** 0.404*** 0.393***
(0.0108) (0.0147) (0.0108) (0.00958) (0.00985) (0.0107) (0.0106)
Religion: Hindu 0.0154 0.122*** 0.0710*** 0.0623*** 0.0672*** 0.0623*** 0.0914***
(0.0120) (0.0146) (0.0119) (0.0110) (0.0116) (0.0121) (0.0120)
Size of Household -0.0897*** -0.0926*** -0.0947*** -0.0709*** -0.0728*** -0.0738*** -0.0714***
(0.00253) (0.00320) (0.00243) (0.00227) (0.00243) (0.00258) (0.00260)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 0-4) 0.0638*** 0.0729*** 0.0745*** 0.0561*** 0.0680*** 0.0570*** 0.0717***
(0.00608) (0.00793) (0.00613) (0.00612) (0.00641) (0.00707) (0.00743)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 5-9) 0.0371*** 0.0435*** 0.0527*** 0.0460*** 0.0390*** 0.0400*** 0.0302***
(0.00576) (0.00729) (0.00533) (0.00543) (0.00587) (0.00630) (0.00638)
Number of Children in the HH (Aged 10-14) 0.0576*** 0.0536*** 0.0488*** 0.0522*** 0.0582*** 0.0648*** 0.0601***
(0.00636) (0.00804) (0.00552) (0.00580) (0.00622) (0.00664) (0.00667)
Constant -0.630*** -1.207*** -0.372*** 0.176** 0.461*** 0.604*** 0.831***
(0.0874) (0.115) (0.0935) (0.0866) (0.0887) (0.0976) (0.0976)
Observations 94,594 104,948 96,675 108,478 101,313 87,201 87,995
Notes: The entries are marginal effects (at means) from first-stage regressions of Heckman two-step estimates of husbands’ predicted wages
in table 2.3 panel C. The first-stage employment probit uses state indicators and household demographics as identifying variables. In addition
to the above, the regressions control for state indicators and quadratic age-education interaction (not shown). They are carried out separately
for each year, and use the sample of all wives from the NSS data. Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. One hundred replications are
carried out in the bootstrap. SCST refers to Scheduled Caste-Scheduled Tribes of India. ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
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